USRE48433E1 - Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code - Google Patents

Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code Download PDF

Info

Publication number
USRE48433E1
USRE48433E1 US15/674,069 US201715674069A USRE48433E US RE48433 E1 USRE48433 E1 US RE48433E1 US 201715674069 A US201715674069 A US 201715674069A US RE48433 E USRE48433 E US RE48433E
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
rolling code
data
patterns
encrypted rolling
providing
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active, expires
Application number
US15/674,069
Inventor
James J. Fitzgibbon
Eric M. Gregori
Edward T. Laird
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Chamberlain Group Inc
Original Assignee
Chamberlain Group Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US11/044,411 external-priority patent/US7071850B1/en
Priority claimed from US11/172,525 external-priority patent/US9148409B2/en
Priority claimed from US11/501,455 external-priority patent/US8422667B2/en
Application filed by Chamberlain Group Inc filed Critical Chamberlain Group Inc
Priority to US15/674,069 priority Critical patent/USRE48433E1/en
Assigned to THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. reassignment THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: FITZGIBBON, JAMES J., GREGORI, ERIC
Assigned to THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. reassignment THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: LAIRD, EDWARD T.
Publication of USRE48433E1 publication Critical patent/USRE48433E1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Assigned to ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT reassignment ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT SECOND LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: Systems, LLC, THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC
Assigned to WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT reassignment WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT FIRST LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: Systems, LLC, THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC
Assigned to THE CHAMBLERLAIN GROUP LLC reassignment THE CHAMBLERLAIN GROUP LLC CONVERSION Assignors: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.
Assigned to THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC reassignment THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC CONVERSION Assignors: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.
Assigned to Systems, LLC, THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC reassignment Systems, LLC NOTICE OF TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS Assignors: ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Active legal-status Critical Current
Adjusted expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00238Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed
    • G07C2009/00253Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically, e.g. variable code - rolling code
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00896Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses
    • G07C2009/00928Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses for garage doors
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to encrypted rolling codes and more particularly to the transmission of encrypted rolling code information.
  • Rolling codes are known in the art. Rolling codes are often used, for example, in conjunction with movable barrier operators of various kinds (with movable barrier operators of various kinds also being known in the art and including operators that effect the selective control and movement of single panel and segmented garage doors, pivoting, rolling, and swinging gates, guard arms, rolling shutters, and various other movable barriers).
  • a wireless transmitter can send a code to a corresponding movable barrier operator to cause the latter to effect a desired movement or other action with respect to, for example, a corresponding movable barrier.
  • the code transmitted by the wireless transmitter will change (often with each transmission) in accordance with a predetermined plan or algorithm that is also known to the movable barrier operator.
  • a predetermined plan or algorithm that is also known to the movable barrier operator.
  • FIG. 1 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention
  • FIG. 2 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 3 comprises a depiction of prior art ternary encoding
  • FIG. 4 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 5 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 6 comprises a mapping table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 7 comprises a schematic view of bit processing and parsing in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 8 comprises a comprises a schematic joint message diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 9 comprises a schematic view of bit selection and parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 10 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 11 comprises a schematic view of two joint messages as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 12 comprises a schematic view of bit parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 13 comprises a schematic view of a joint message as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 14 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 15 comprises a schematic view of bit processing and parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 16 comprises a schematic view of a joint message as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 17 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 18 comprises a block diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
  • an encrypted rolling code a plurality of differing data bit order patterns, and a plurality of differing data inversion patterns are provided.
  • a wireless remote control transmitter can be provided with data to be transmitted, where that data comprises, at least in part, at least portions of an encrypted rolling code and where that data comports with a particular data bit order pattern and a particular data inversion pattern as a function of a given portion of that rolling code. That data can then be transmitted in combination with the given portion of the encrypted rolling code wherein that given portion of the rolling code is not transmitted with any of its bits reordered or inverted as a function of the given portion itself. Accordingly, a receiver that receives the data can then properly recover the re-ordered/inverted portions of the encrypted rolling code as a function of the given portion of the encrypted rolling code.
  • the aforementioned data can comprise ternary data that is presented in a binary format.
  • the use of ternary data can aid in facilitating compatible interaction with at least some movable barrier operators while also achieving an encryption effect at the same time as tending to ensure compatible use with binary peripheral platforms and the like.
  • this can comprise mapping each trit of the ternary data to a corresponding pair of binary bits.
  • a pair of binary bits can represent 4 discrete information elements and by one approach, three of these discrete information elements can each correspond to one of the three trit states/levels while the fourth discrete information element (which otherwise comprises an illegal value) can serve a synchronization function.
  • a fixed code can also be included in the transmission.
  • both the aforementioned part of the encrypted rolling code and this fixed code can be transmitted using the above-described selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
  • an illustrative process in this regard provides 11 an encrypted rolling code.
  • this can comprise, if desired, providing an encrypted rolling code as a plurality of bit pairs as correspond to a ternary data set.
  • this process will also optionally accommodate providing 12 a fixed code.
  • This fixed code can vary with the needs, requirements, and/or opportunities of a given application setting, but can, for example, comprise a value that is substantially unique to a given transmitter and hence comprises a value that will serve to identify that given transmitter. Such an approach can be useful, for example, when used in conjunction with a remote control movable barrier operator transmitter.
  • This process also provides 13 a plurality of differing data bit order patterns.
  • this can comprise data bit order patterns that each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits. As will be shown below, this can be particularly beneficial when used in conjunction with bit pairs that correlate to corresponding ternary data.
  • this process provides 14 a plurality of different data inversion patterns. As before, if desired, this can comprise providing patterns that each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits. The number of patterns provided in either case can vary as desired. By one approach, however, this can comprise providing at least nine different bit order patterns and nine different data inversion patterns. Illustrative examples in this regard are provided further herein.
  • This process then provides for selecting 15 a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide resultant corresponding selected patterns.
  • selections can be made.
  • one may use a predetermined portion of the previously provided encrypted rolling code to inform the making of these selections.
  • this can comprise using a predetermined four bit pairs of the encrypted rolling code as a basis for selecting the particular data bit order pattern and the particular data inversion pattern.
  • this can comprise using a first predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select a first particular data bit order pattern and a first data inversion pattern and using a second predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code (that is, for example, discrete with respect to the first predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code though this is not a fundamental requirement) to select a second particular data bit order pattern and a second data inversion pattern.
  • This process then provides for transmitting 16 at least a part of the encrypted rolling code itself (as well as at least a part of the above-described fixed code when present) using the aforementioned selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
  • this can comprise making such a transmission using Manchester encoding as is known in the art.
  • these teachings are readily employed, for example, to facilitate the transmission of a remote control message.
  • This can comprise, for example, providing a fixed message having at least a first part and a second part along with an encrypted rolling code that has a first through a fourth part.
  • the first part of the encrypted rolling code can then be used to select a particular data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use as a set of first selected patterns while the second part of the encrypted rolling code can be used to select a second set of patterns from amongst the available candidate patterns.
  • One can then transmit the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics while transmitting the second part of the fixed message and the fourth art of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
  • this can also comprise transmitting the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code without using either the first or selected patterns as transmission characteristics. So configured, the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code are then readily usable as recovery identifiers that can be used by a receiver to recover the first and second parts of the fixed message and the third and fourth parts of the encrypted rolling code.
  • these first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code could each comprise four bit pairs as correspond to the aforementioned ternary data.
  • two of the bit pairs as comprise the first part of the encrypted rolling code can be used with a lookup table to correlate those two bit pairs to a corresponding data bit order pattern.
  • the remaining bit pairs can be used with a second lookup table (which may, if desired, actually comprise a part of the first lookup table) to correlate these bit pairs with a corresponding data inversion pattern.
  • two of the bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the second part of the encrypted rolling code can be used with that first lookup table to identify another data bit order pattern while the remaining two bit pairs can be used with the second lookup table to identify a corresponding data inversion pattern.
  • the aforementioned transmission can then comprise transmitting the second part of the fixed message and the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics only after not transmitting for at least a predetermined period of time following transmission of the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
  • the duration of this predetermined period of time can vary with the needs and opportunities of a given application setting, but a duration of about 75 milliseconds will suffice for many expected purposes.
  • a data payload such as a remote control instruction such as OPEN, CLOSE, VACATION MODE, LIGHTS ON, LIGHTS OFF, and so forth
  • the data payload comprises a relatively large quantity of data as compared to the fixed message and/or the encrypted rolling code
  • additional portions of the data payload as are not accommodated by the just-described process can then be supplementally transmitted using one of the already selected patterns (or other patterns, if desired) as transmission characteristics.
  • a wireless remote control transmitter (such as a movable barrier operator remote control) can be configured and arranged to provide 21 data to be transmitted.
  • This data can comprise, at least in part, at least portions of an encrypted rolling code.
  • this data will comport with a particular data bit order pattern and a particular data inversion pattern as a function of a given portion of the rolling code.
  • this process can further comprise, at least in part, storing 22 this data in a memory prior to transmitting the data. The duration of such storage can vary considerably depending upon the specifics of a given application setting.
  • This wireless remote control transmitter can then transmit 23 this data in combination with the given portion of the encrypted rolling code such that the given portion of the encrypted rolling code is not transmitted with any of its bits reordered or inverted as a function of the given portion of the encrypted rolling code. So configured, a receiver that receives this data can properly recover the modified portions of the encrypted rolling code as a function, at least in part, of the unmodified given portion of the encrypted rolling code.
  • pulses of similar amplitude have one of three different durations. For example, and referring now to FIG. 3 , a first pulse 31 , having a shortest duration, can represent the data element “0.” A second pulse 32 , having a medium length duration, can represent the data element or state “1.” And a third pulse 33 , having a longest duration, can represent the data element or state “2.” Such a data mapping protocol serves well to effect a base three-based data exchange.
  • the present teachings can accommodate use and leveraging of a ternary approach to effect relatively secure and compatible communications between a movable barrier operators and corresponding peripheral components of choice. These teachings are also compatible for use with an approach that eschews the specific ternary approach just described.
  • these teachings will accommodate a process 40 that itself provides 41 ternary data as corresponds to a movable barrier operator and then converts 42 that ternary data to a binary format to provide resultant binary information. This binary information is then transmitted 43 from one platform to another.
  • this ternary-to-binary conversion process serves, at least in part, as a kind of encryption process which in turn aids in ensuring the authenticity and accuracy of the information being transmitted.
  • the ternary data itself can comprise, at least in part, bearer data. More particularly, and referring momentarily to FIG. 5 , pursuant to one (optional) approach, provision of ternary data can comprise prior provision 51 of binary bits comprising information that corresponds to the movable barrier operator (for example, information sourced by, or intended for, a movable barrier operator). Such information can optionally comprise, for example, movable barrier operator fixed information 52 such as identifying information for a particular movable barrier operator, a particular peripheral component, or the like. Such information can also optionally comprise (in addition to or in lieu of fixed information 52 ) non-fixed information 53 such as the aforementioned data payload as again corresponds to the movable barrier operator. This non-fixed information 53 can comprise bearer data/information (such as, but not limited to, platform status information, commands, acknowledgments, and so forth). As already noted, this non-fixed information 53 can also comprise varying quantities of data if desired.
  • movable barrier operator fixed information 52 such as identifying information for
  • binary bits are then converted 54 into the aforementioned ternary data.
  • the binary data can be converted into a binary-bit-based ternary format (with an illustrative example being provided further below).
  • the ternary-to-binary conversion step can comprise mapping each trit of the ternary data to a corresponding pair of binary bits.
  • the ternary data element “0” (which corresponds to the usual binary data element “0”) maps to the binary pair “00.”
  • ternary “1” (which corresponds to usual binary “1”) maps to the binary pair “01”
  • ternary “2” (which corresponds to usual binary “11”) maps to the binary pair “01.”
  • this otherwise illegal value can serve a synchronization function when facilitating communications as between a movable barrier operator and one or more peripheral components when using a binary format that otherwise has no synchronization mechanism built into its format (for example, a stream of binary bits such as:
  • a synchronization signal/marker comprising this “11” binary pair can be used to indicate, for example, the regular end and/or start of a frame or message as in the following example:
  • the only substantive content to be associated and transmitted with a 28 bit rolling code 71 comprises a 40 bit value that represents fixed information 72 .
  • This fixed information 72 may serve, for example, to uniquely identify the transmitter that will ultimately transmit this information as noted above.
  • the bits comprising the rolling code 71 are encrypted 73 by mirroring the bits and then translating those mirrored bits into ternary values as suggested above to provide corresponding bit pairs (in this example, this would comprise 18 such bit pairs) to thereby provide a resultant encrypted rolling code 74 .
  • This mirroring can be applied to specific groupings of bits in the rolling code creating mirrored groups or can involve the entire value.
  • the encrypted rolling code 74 is presented for further processing as four groups.
  • these four groups comprise a roll group E 74 A comprised of four binary bit pairs, a roll group F 74 B comprised of five binary bit pairs, a roll group G 74 C comprised of four binary bit pairs, and a roll group H 74 D comprised of five binary bit pairs.
  • the 40 bit fixed information 72 is subdivided in a similar manner albeit sans encryption. This comprises, in this particular illustrative approach, forming four subgroups comprising a fixed group A 75 A, a fixed group B 75 B, a fixed group C 75 C, and a fixed group D 75 D, wherein each such group is comprised of 10 bits of the original 40 bit value.
  • one or more joint messages 80 provide a primary vehicle by which to communicate the desired information (which includes both the encrypted rolling code and fixed information data as modified as a function of a given portion of the encrypted rolling code along with a recovery identifier that represents that given portion of the encrypted rolling code).
  • This joint message 80 comprises, generally speaking, a first 20 bit portion 81 and a second 30 bit portion 82 .
  • the first portion 81 comprises, in this embodiment, the following fields:
  • восем ⁇ bits from the encrypted roll group 74 are selected to form a corresponding roll sub-group 91 .
  • These might comprise, for example, the first or the last eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 (in a forward or reversed order).
  • These might also comprise, for example, any eight consecutive bits beginning with any pre-selected bit position (such as, to illustrate, the seventh bit, the 21 st bit, and so forth).
  • Other possibilities also exist. For example, only even position bits or odd position bits could serve in this regard. It would also be possible, for example, to use preselected bits as comprise one or more of the previously described roll group sub-groups such as roll group E 74 A or roll group G 74 C.
  • the selection mechanism from, for example, joint message to joint message.
  • the first eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 could be used to form the roll sub-group 91 with the last eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 being used in a similar fashion in an alternating manner.
  • the eight bits that comprise this roll sub-group 91 are then further parsed to form the two recovery indicators 81 E and 81 F mentioned above. Again, there are numerous ways by which one may use the bits that comprise the roll sub-group 91 to form these recovery indicators 81 E and 81 F.
  • the bits as comprise the roll sub-group 91 can be used in their existing (or reversed) order to form roll group 1 81 E and roll group 2 81 F.
  • bit B 3 of roll group 1 81 E would comprise bit seven from the roll sub-group 91 with bit B 2 then corresponding to bit six and so forth.
  • bit B 3 could comprise bit six from the roll sub-group 91
  • bit B 2 could comprise bit four from the roll sub-group 91 , and so forth.
  • bit B 7 would then comprise bit seven from the roll sub-group 91
  • bit B 6 would comprise bit five from the roll sub-group 91 , and so forth.
  • the “B 7 , B 6 , B 5 , B 4 ” values from the corresponding recovery indicator are used in conjunction with one or more lookup tables to determine a data bit order pattern to use with respect to formatting the data as comprises the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 .
  • the “B 3 , B 2 , B 1 , B 0 ” values are used in conjunction with a lookup table to determine a data bit order pattern to also use with that second portion 82 of the joint message 80 .
  • the data in the second portion 82 of the joint message comprises 10 bits from roll group F (or H) and 10 bits each from fixed group A (or C) and fixed group B (or D) for a total of 30 bits. These bits are organized into triplets (shown in FIG. 8 in the form “(F, B, A)” and “(H, D, C)” to indicate that each such triplet includes one bit from a roll group F or H and one bit each from the two fixed groups B and A or D and C.
  • bits from roll group E 74 A and roll group G 74 C are not present in the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 . This is because, in this example, it is presumed that the contents of these two roll groups are used to form the recovery indicators that appear in the first portion 81 of the joint message 80 .
  • Other accommodations can of course be made in this regard. In general, however, these teachings will accommodate not including those encrypted rolling code bits that are used as recovery indicators in the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 .
  • the order of the bits in each triplet is “F, B, A” (or “H, D, C” as appropriate). This order is neither arbitrary nor static. Instead, for this particular joint message 80 , this order of the bits in each triplet is dictated by the values B 7 , B 6 , B 5 , B 4 noted above. In this case, and referring now to FIG. 10 , a lookup table 101 serves to correlate various values for these two bit pairs with corresponding data bit order patterns. In this example, presuming that the values of these four bits happens to be “0000,” the corresponding order of bits for each triplet is established as “F/H, B/D, A/C” and hence the ordering of the bits depicted in FIG. 8 .
  • this lookup table 101 provides no patterns that would correlate to two bit pairs having the value “11.” This is because, in this embodiment, “11” as a bit pair value comprises an illegal value and hence is not expected to occur. Accordingly there are no bit order patterns presented to correlate with such values as “11XX,” “XX11,” or “1111.” This creates 9 possible selections for the order of bits and the inversion value. The number of possible unique order of three bits leads to only six different bit order patterns. This degree of diversity should suffice for most if not all purposes.
  • the aforementioned B 3 , B 2 , B 1 , B 0 values 81 F are employed in a similar fashion with this lookup table 101 to identify a particular inversion pattern to be employed with the data triplets of the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 . For example, when these bits are “0000,” this lookup table provides for no inversion of any of the bits in each triplet. On the other hand, when these bits are “1010,” each bit of each triplet is to be inverted. In this case, up to eight different inversion patterns are possible.
  • the lookup table will return a data inversion pattern of “normal invert invert.” As a result, this particular data triplet will instead have the values “101” because the second and third values in each triplet are now to be inverted in value.
  • a first portion of a joint message is seen to include a recovery indicator that itself comprises a selected portion of an encrypted rolling code.
  • a second portion of that joint message contains data triplets having bits that are arranged in a particular order and that observe a particular inversion pattern as a function of that joint indicator. Accordingly, it will not be sufficient for an unauthorized party to simply glean, in some fashion, the basis of the rolling code itself. Instead, now, this unauthorized party must also now understand how a particular portion of that rolling code is used to modify the transmission of other portions of that rolling code in addition to fixed information as may also accompany the rolling code.
  • the first joint message 80 A can present and use a first roll sub-group 91 as defined above as a recovery identifier (which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group E 74 A) while the second joint message 80 B presents and uses a second, different roll sub-group B 91 (which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group G 74 C) for this purpose.
  • a recovery identifier which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group E 74 A
  • the second joint message 80 B presents and uses a second, different roll sub-group B 91 (which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group G 74 C) for this purpose.
  • these joint messages 80 A and 80 B can be sent in a concatenated manner.
  • these joint messages can be separated by at least a minimal amount of silence (achieved, for example, by not transmitting during this period of time). For example, 75 milliseconds or so of blank time can be used for this purpose. So configured, a receiver that receives a second joint message prior to this period of blank time expiring can conclude that one or both of the received messages is somehow in error and should be avoided.
  • additional data that represents a particular instruction, status information, or the like.
  • additional information can be readily accommodated by the teachings set forth above.
  • 32 bits of such additional data can be subdivided into four corresponding data groups I and J 122 A and 122 B and K and L 122 C and 122 D where each such data group has eight bits.
  • each joint message 80 can now comprise 54 bits.
  • this can comprise 8 bits for a repeated presentation of the same rolling code group E or G as comprises the recovery identifier, 10 bits each for rolling code group F or H, fixed group A or C, and fixed group B or D, as well as 8 bits each for data group I or K and data group J or L as are described above.
  • These various bits are again combined into data triplets using a group selection pattern such as that illustrated in FIG. 13 .
  • the recovery identifier comprised of the roll group presented in the first portion 81 of the joint message 80 is used to select from a lookup table(s) the particular bit order and inversion patterns to employ with respect to these data triplets.
  • the lookup table 141 can include specific bit order patterns that apply in different ways depending upon whether the data triplet includes the supplemental data.
  • 32 bit value data elements 151 can be parsed using an application defined algorithm 152 of choice as corresponds to the data itself (or as may be otherwise provided or selected) into four ternary bit pairs 153 and three data groups of N bits each 154 A- 154 C.
  • the recovery indicator can be reused from a previous related joint message and the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 can contain 3 to the Nth power bits as necessary to accommodate the full data payload.
  • the three data groups A-C are then used to form corresponding data triplets.
  • the recovery identifier is used to extract from a corresponding lookup table (such as the lookup table 171 presented in FIG. 17 ) the particular bit order pattern and bit inversion pattern to employ with respect to the transmission of these data triplets.
  • the apparatus 180 (which may comprise, for example, a wireless remote control transmitter) comprises a processor 181 that couples to a transmitter 182 (such as a wireless transmitter) of choice. Both of these components then also operably couple to a first memory 183 , a second memory 184 , a first lookup table 185 , and a second lookup table 186 .
  • the first memory 183 can have a fixed value stored therein. This fixed value can comprise, for example, information that substantially uniquely identifies this particular apparatus 180 .
  • This first memory 183 may also, if desired, have a plurality of different fixed values contained therein. This would permit storing, for example, remote control signals that are not specific (i.e., unique) to the apparatus 180 itself.
  • the second memory 184 can have the aforementioned encrypted rolling code stored therein.
  • the processor 181 is configured and arranged to calculate the encrypted rolling code when needed and to temporarily buffer that value in the second memory 184 pending actual use of that information.
  • the encrypted rolling code information can be pre-provisioned using a derivation and storage approach of choice.
  • the lookup tables 185 and 186 are the lookup tables described above.
  • the first lookup table 185 can comprise the lookup table that correlates a first plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding differing data bit order patterns.
  • the second lookup table 186 can comprise the lookup table that correlates a second plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding different data inversion patterns.
  • the processor 181 itself is configured and arranged (via, for example, appropriate programming) to carry out selected teachings as have been presented above. So configured, for example, the processor 181 can be configured and arranged to use the encrypted rolling code to select ones of the particular data bit order patterns and data inversion patterns for the transmitter 182 to use as transmission characteristics when transmitting the fixed value and at least portions of the encrypted rolling code.
  • the processor can use a first part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a first part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value and a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value.
  • Such an apparatus 180 may be comprised of a plurality of physically distinct elements as is suggested by the illustration shown in FIG. 18 . It is also possible, however, to view this illustration as comprising a logical view, in which case one or more of these elements can be enabled and realized via a shared platform and/or a more-widely-distributed platform. It will also be understood that such a shared platform may comprise a wholly or at least partially programmable platform as are known in the art.

Abstract

An encrypted rolling code (11), a plurality of differing data bit order patterns (13), and a plurality of differing data inversion patterns 14) are provided. One then selects (15) a particular one of each of these patterns and uses those selected patterns as transmission characteristics when transmitting (16) at least part of the encrypted rolling code.

Description

RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application is a reissue application of application Ser. No. 11/501,455, filed Aug. 9, 2006, issued on Apr. 16, 2013 as U.S. Pat. No. 8,422,667, which is:
a continuation in part of application Ser. No. 11/480,288 which was filed on Jun. 30, 2006 as a continuation of application Ser. No. 11/044,411, which is entitled METHOD AND APPARATUS TO FACILITATE TRANSMISSION OF TERNARY MOVABLE BARRIER OPERATOR INFORMATION, which was filed on Jan. 27, 2005, and is now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,071,850; and
This application is a continuation in part of application Ser. No. 11/172,525 filed Jun. 30, 2005 and entitled METHOD AND APPARATUS TO FACILITATE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION USING DIFFERENT TRANSMISSION CHARACTERISTICS the contents of which are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
TECHNICAL FIELD
This invention relates generally to encrypted rolling codes and more particularly to the transmission of encrypted rolling code information.
BACKGROUND
Rolling codes are known in the art. Rolling codes are often used, for example, in conjunction with movable barrier operators of various kinds (with movable barrier operators of various kinds also being known in the art and including operators that effect the selective control and movement of single panel and segmented garage doors, pivoting, rolling, and swinging gates, guard arms, rolling shutters, and various other movable barriers). In such an application setting, a wireless transmitter can send a code to a corresponding movable barrier operator to cause the latter to effect a desired movement or other action with respect to, for example, a corresponding movable barrier.
When using rolling codes, the code transmitted by the wireless transmitter will change (often with each transmission) in accordance with a predetermined plan or algorithm that is also known to the movable barrier operator. Such an approach can foil the use of an intercepted code by an unauthorized party because that intercepted code will not typically again, at least in the near term, be honored by that movable barrier operator should the unauthorized party attempt to themselves transmit that code. Without knowledge of the underlying scheme by which a next code is selected, the unauthorized party who gains access to a presently used code will still remain unable to leverage that knowledge in support of effecting unauthorized control over the movable barrier operator.
There may be instances, however, when additional security may be desired or appropriate. For example, a given rolling code instantiation may be open to brute force attacks or other weaknesses due to local and/or otherwise unique circumstances.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The above needs are at least partially met through provision of the method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code described in the following detailed description, particularly when studied in conjunction with the drawings, wherein:
FIG. 1 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 2 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 3 comprises a depiction of prior art ternary encoding;
FIG. 4 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 5 comprises a flow diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 6 comprises a mapping table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 7 comprises a schematic view of bit processing and parsing in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 8 comprises a comprises a schematic joint message diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 9 comprises a schematic view of bit selection and parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 10 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 11 comprises a schematic view of two joint messages as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 12 comprises a schematic view of bit parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 13 comprises a schematic view of a joint message as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 14 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 15 comprises a schematic view of bit processing and parsing as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 16 comprises a schematic view of a joint message as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention;
FIG. 17 comprises an illustrative example of a lookup table as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention; and
FIG. 18 comprises a block diagram as configured in accordance with various embodiments of the invention.
Skilled artisans will appreciate that elements in the figures are illustrated for simplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale. For example, the dimensions and/or relative positioning of some of the elements in the figures may be exaggerated relative to other elements to help to improve understanding of various embodiments of the present invention. Also, common but well-understood elements that are useful or necessary in a commercially feasible embodiment are often not depicted in order to facilitate a less obstructed view of these various embodiments of the present invention. It will also be understood that the terms and expressions used herein have the ordinary meaning as is accorded to such terms and expressions with respect to their corresponding respective areas of inquiry and study except where specific meanings have otherwise been set forth herein.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Generally speaking, pursuant to these various embodiments, an encrypted rolling code, a plurality of differing data bit order patterns, and a plurality of differing data inversion patterns are provided. One selects a particular one of each of the bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide selected patterns and then uses those selected patterns as transmission characteristics when transmitting at least part of the encrypted rolling code.
By these teachings, for example, a wireless remote control transmitter can be provided with data to be transmitted, where that data comprises, at least in part, at least portions of an encrypted rolling code and where that data comports with a particular data bit order pattern and a particular data inversion pattern as a function of a given portion of that rolling code. That data can then be transmitted in combination with the given portion of the encrypted rolling code wherein that given portion of the rolling code is not transmitted with any of its bits reordered or inverted as a function of the given portion itself. Accordingly, a receiver that receives the data can then properly recover the re-ordered/inverted portions of the encrypted rolling code as a function of the given portion of the encrypted rolling code.
By one approach, if desired, the aforementioned data can comprise ternary data that is presented in a binary format. The use of ternary data can aid in facilitating compatible interaction with at least some movable barrier operators while also achieving an encryption effect at the same time as tending to ensure compatible use with binary peripheral platforms and the like. By one approach, this can comprise mapping each trit of the ternary data to a corresponding pair of binary bits. A pair of binary bits can represent 4 discrete information elements and by one approach, three of these discrete information elements can each correspond to one of the three trit states/levels while the fourth discrete information element (which otherwise comprises an illegal value) can serve a synchronization function.
If desired, in addition to the aforementioned encrypted rolling code, a fixed code can also be included in the transmission. By one approach, for example, both the aforementioned part of the encrypted rolling code and this fixed code can be transmitted using the above-described selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
These and other benefits may become clearer upon making a thorough review and study of the following detailed description. Referring now to the drawings, and in particular to FIG. 1, an illustrative process in this regard provides 11 an encrypted rolling code. As will be illustrated in more detail below, this can comprise, if desired, providing an encrypted rolling code as a plurality of bit pairs as correspond to a ternary data set.
If desired, this process will also optionally accommodate providing 12 a fixed code. This fixed code can vary with the needs, requirements, and/or opportunities of a given application setting, but can, for example, comprise a value that is substantially unique to a given transmitter and hence comprises a value that will serve to identify that given transmitter. Such an approach can be useful, for example, when used in conjunction with a remote control movable barrier operator transmitter.
This process also provides 13 a plurality of differing data bit order patterns. By one approach, for example, this can comprise data bit order patterns that each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits. As will be shown below, this can be particularly beneficial when used in conjunction with bit pairs that correlate to corresponding ternary data. Similarly, this process provides 14 a plurality of different data inversion patterns. As before, if desired, this can comprise providing patterns that each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits. The number of patterns provided in either case can vary as desired. By one approach, however, this can comprise providing at least nine different bit order patterns and nine different data inversion patterns. Illustrative examples in this regard are provided further herein.
This process then provides for selecting 15 a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide resultant corresponding selected patterns. There are various ways by which such selections can be made. By one approach, one may use a predetermined portion of the previously provided encrypted rolling code to inform the making of these selections. For example (and as will be illustrated in more detail herein), this can comprise using a predetermined four bit pairs of the encrypted rolling code as a basis for selecting the particular data bit order pattern and the particular data inversion pattern. As another example in this regard, in combination with the foregoing or in lieu thereof, this can comprise using a first predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select a first particular data bit order pattern and a first data inversion pattern and using a second predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code (that is, for example, discrete with respect to the first predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code though this is not a fundamental requirement) to select a second particular data bit order pattern and a second data inversion pattern.
This process then provides for transmitting 16 at least a part of the encrypted rolling code itself (as well as at least a part of the above-described fixed code when present) using the aforementioned selected patterns as transmission characteristics. By one approach this can comprise making such a transmission using Manchester encoding as is known in the art.
So configured, these teachings are readily employed, for example, to facilitate the transmission of a remote control message. This can comprise, for example, providing a fixed message having at least a first part and a second part along with an encrypted rolling code that has a first through a fourth part. The first part of the encrypted rolling code can then be used to select a particular data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use as a set of first selected patterns while the second part of the encrypted rolling code can be used to select a second set of patterns from amongst the available candidate patterns. One can then transmit the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics while transmitting the second part of the fixed message and the fourth art of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
By one approach, in this illustrative example this can also comprise transmitting the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code without using either the first or selected patterns as transmission characteristics. So configured, the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code are then readily usable as recovery identifiers that can be used by a receiver to recover the first and second parts of the fixed message and the third and fourth parts of the encrypted rolling code.
To illustrate further in this regard, these first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code could each comprise four bit pairs as correspond to the aforementioned ternary data. In such a case, two of the bit pairs as comprise the first part of the encrypted rolling code can be used with a lookup table to correlate those two bit pairs to a corresponding data bit order pattern. In a similar manner the remaining bit pairs can be used with a second lookup table (which may, if desired, actually comprise a part of the first lookup table) to correlate these bit pairs with a corresponding data inversion pattern. In a similar fashion, two of the bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the second part of the encrypted rolling code can be used with that first lookup table to identify another data bit order pattern while the remaining two bit pairs can be used with the second lookup table to identify a corresponding data inversion pattern.
In such a case, the aforementioned transmission can then comprise transmitting the second part of the fixed message and the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics only after not transmitting for at least a predetermined period of time following transmission of the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics. The duration of this predetermined period of time can vary with the needs and opportunities of a given application setting, but a duration of about 75 milliseconds will suffice for many expected purposes.
In addition to facilitating a transmission of an encrypted rolling code and other content that comprises, for example, information that is unique to a given transmitter (such as a unique identifier for that transmitter), these teachings will further readily accommodate the transmission of additional data that is not substantially unique to the transmitter. This can comprise, for example, providing a data payload (such as a remote control instruction such as OPEN, CLOSE, VACATION MODE, LIGHTS ON, LIGHTS OFF, and so forth) that is not substantially unique to a given transmitter and then transmitting the first part of the fixed message, the third part of the encrypted rolling code, and a first part of this data payload while using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics and transmitting the second part of the fixed message, the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code, and a second (remaining) portion of the data payload using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics. When the data payload comprises a relatively large quantity of data as compared to the fixed message and/or the encrypted rolling code, additional portions of the data payload as are not accommodated by the just-described process can then be supplementally transmitted using one of the already selected patterns (or other patterns, if desired) as transmission characteristics.
As another specific illustrative example in this regard, and referring now to FIG. 2, a wireless remote control transmitter (such as a movable barrier operator remote control) can be configured and arranged to provide 21 data to be transmitted. This data can comprise, at least in part, at least portions of an encrypted rolling code. In any event, this data will comport with a particular data bit order pattern and a particular data inversion pattern as a function of a given portion of the rolling code. By one approach, if desired, this process can further comprise, at least in part, storing 22 this data in a memory prior to transmitting the data. The duration of such storage can vary considerably depending upon the specifics of a given application setting.
This wireless remote control transmitter can then transmit 23 this data in combination with the given portion of the encrypted rolling code such that the given portion of the encrypted rolling code is not transmitted with any of its bits reordered or inverted as a function of the given portion of the encrypted rolling code. So configured, a receiver that receives this data can properly recover the modified portions of the encrypted rolling code as a function, at least in part, of the unmodified given portion of the encrypted rolling code.
As noted above, these teachings are readily applied in a context that makes use of ternary data. It may therefore be helpful to first describe in more detail a typical ternary data protocol as one finds often deployed in conjunction with many movable barrier operators. Pursuant to one approach, pulses of similar amplitude have one of three different durations. For example, and referring now to FIG. 3, a first pulse 31, having a shortest duration, can represent the data element “0.” A second pulse 32, having a medium length duration, can represent the data element or state “1.” And a third pulse 33, having a longest duration, can represent the data element or state “2.” Such a data mapping protocol serves well to effect a base three-based data exchange. The present teachings can accommodate use and leveraging of a ternary approach to effect relatively secure and compatible communications between a movable barrier operators and corresponding peripheral components of choice. These teachings are also compatible for use with an approach that eschews the specific ternary approach just described.
Referring now to FIG. 4, in general, these teachings will accommodate a process 40 that itself provides 41 ternary data as corresponds to a movable barrier operator and then converts 42 that ternary data to a binary format to provide resultant binary information. This binary information is then transmitted 43 from one platform to another. As will be shown below, this ternary-to-binary conversion process serves, at least in part, as a kind of encryption process which in turn aids in ensuring the authenticity and accuracy of the information being transmitted.
The ternary data itself can comprise, at least in part, bearer data. More particularly, and referring momentarily to FIG. 5, pursuant to one (optional) approach, provision of ternary data can comprise prior provision 51 of binary bits comprising information that corresponds to the movable barrier operator (for example, information sourced by, or intended for, a movable barrier operator). Such information can optionally comprise, for example, movable barrier operator fixed information 52 such as identifying information for a particular movable barrier operator, a particular peripheral component, or the like. Such information can also optionally comprise (in addition to or in lieu of fixed information 52) non-fixed information 53 such as the aforementioned data payload as again corresponds to the movable barrier operator. This non-fixed information 53 can comprise bearer data/information (such as, but not limited to, platform status information, commands, acknowledgments, and so forth). As already noted, this non-fixed information 53 can also comprise varying quantities of data if desired.
These binary bits are then converted 54 into the aforementioned ternary data. This could comprise, in an appropriate platform, a conversion of the binary data into ternary data such as that described above with respect to FIG. 3. In general, such an approach need not be used. Instead, the binary data can be converted into a binary-bit-based ternary format (with an illustrative example being provided further below).
By one approach, however, this does not comprise a simple reversal of the binary-to-ternary process just described. Instead, the ternary-to-binary conversion step can comprise mapping each trit of the ternary data to a corresponding pair of binary bits. To illustrate such a map 61, and referring momentarily to FIG. 6, the ternary data element “0” (which corresponds to the usual binary data element “0”) maps to the binary pair “00.” In similar fashion, ternary “1” (which corresponds to usual binary “1”) maps to the binary pair “01” and ternary “2” (which corresponds to usual binary “11”) maps to the binary pair “01.”
This leaves an otherwise unused binary pair “11.” Pursuant to a preferred approach, this otherwise illegal value can serve a synchronization function when facilitating communications as between a movable barrier operator and one or more peripheral components when using a binary format that otherwise has no synchronization mechanism built into its format (for example, a stream of binary bits such as:
011011111110100111011101101111111010011101110110111111101001110111 which format lacks a frame marker or other point of synchronization). To illustrate, a synchronization signal/marker comprising this “11” binary pair can be used to indicate, for example, the regular end and/or start of a frame or message as in the following example:
110110111111011110111011110110111111101111110111111101101111111011111 where the bold font “11” regularly spaced binary pairs serve as frame markers (and which, due to their synchronized regular spacing, are readily distinguishable from other “11” pairs as may occur for whatever reason (illustratively depicted in the above example with italic font).
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that this process of converting binary information into ternary information, followed by conversion of that ternary information into corresponding binary pairs, yields, in most cases, a different bit sequence (and even a different number of bits) as compared to the initial binary information. This difference serves, at least in part, as a non-key-based encryption technique and hence provides a way of effecting the provision of an encrypted rolling code.
Referring now to FIG. 7, a more detailed illustrative embodiment will be presented. In this first illustrative example, the only substantive content to be associated and transmitted with a 28 bit rolling code 71 comprises a 40 bit value that represents fixed information 72. This fixed information 72 may serve, for example, to uniquely identify the transmitter that will ultimately transmit this information as noted above.
In this particular illustrative embodiment, the bits comprising the rolling code 71 are encrypted 73 by mirroring the bits and then translating those mirrored bits into ternary values as suggested above to provide corresponding bit pairs (in this example, this would comprise 18 such bit pairs) to thereby provide a resultant encrypted rolling code 74. This mirroring can be applied to specific groupings of bits in the rolling code creating mirrored groups or can involve the entire value. In this illustrative example, the encrypted rolling code 74 is presented for further processing as four groups. In this example, these four groups comprise a roll group E 74A comprised of four binary bit pairs, a roll group F 74B comprised of five binary bit pairs, a roll group G 74C comprised of four binary bit pairs, and a roll group H 74D comprised of five binary bit pairs.
The 40 bit fixed information 72 is subdivided in a similar manner albeit sans encryption. This comprises, in this particular illustrative approach, forming four subgroups comprising a fixed group A 75A, a fixed group B 75B, a fixed group C 75C, and a fixed group D 75D, wherein each such group is comprised of 10 bits of the original 40 bit value.
These variously partitioned data groups can then be used as shown in FIG. 8 to effect a desired transmission. In this example, one or more joint messages 80 provide a primary vehicle by which to communicate the desired information (which includes both the encrypted rolling code and fixed information data as modified as a function of a given portion of the encrypted rolling code along with a recovery identifier that represents that given portion of the encrypted rolling code). This joint message 80 comprises, generally speaking, a first 20 bit portion 81 and a second 30 bit portion 82.
The first portion 81 comprises, in this embodiment, the following fields:
    • “0000”—these bits 81A serve to precharge the decoding process and effectively establish an operational threshold;
    • “1111”—these bits 81B comprise two bit pairs that present the illegal state “11” (“illegal” because this corresponds to a fourth unassigned state in the ternary context of these communications) and serve here as a basis for facilitating synchronization with a receiving platform;
    • “00”—this bit pair 81C identifies a type of payload being borne by the joint message (in this embodiment, “00” corresponds to no payload other than the fixed identifying information for the transmitter itself, “01” corresponds to a supplemental data payload, and “10” corresponds to a supplemental data-only payload—further explanation regarding these payload types appears further below);
    • “Xx”—this bit pair 81D presents a frame identifier that can be used by a receiver to determine whether all required joint messages 80 have been received and which can also be used to facilitate proper reconstruction of the transmitted data;
    • “B3, B2, B1, B0”—these two bit pairs 81E comprise an inversion pattern recovery identifier and are selected from the bits that comprise the encrypted rolling code 74 described above;
    • “B7, B6, B5, B4”—these two bit pairs 81F comprise a bit order pattern recovery identifier and are also selected from the bits that comprise the encrypted rolling code 74 described above.
There are various ways by which these recover identifier values can be selected. Referring momentarily to FIG. 9, by one approach, eight bits from the encrypted roll group 74 are selected to form a corresponding roll sub-group 91. These might comprise, for example, the first or the last eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 (in a forward or reversed order). These might also comprise, for example, any eight consecutive bits beginning with any pre-selected bit position (such as, to illustrate, the seventh bit, the 21st bit, and so forth). Other possibilities also exist. For example, only even position bits or odd position bits could serve in this regard. It would also be possible, for example, to use preselected bits as comprise one or more of the previously described roll group sub-groups such as roll group E 74A or roll group G 74C.
It would also be possible to vary the selection mechanism from, for example, joint message to joint message. By one simple approach in this regard, for example, the first eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 could be used to form the roll sub-group 91 with the last eight bits of the encrypted roll group 74 being used in a similar fashion in an alternating manner.
The eight bits that comprise this roll sub-group 91 are then further parsed to form the two recovery indicators 81E and 81F mentioned above. Again, there are numerous ways by which one may use the bits that comprise the roll sub-group 91 to form these recovery indicators 81E and 81F. By one simple approach, for example, the bits as comprise the roll sub-group 91 can be used in their existing (or reversed) order to form roll group 1 81E and roll group 2 81F. Using this approach, for example, bit B3 of roll group 1 81E would comprise bit seven from the roll sub-group 91 with bit B2 then corresponding to bit six and so forth.
By another approach, if desired, every other bit can be applied in this manner. So configured, for example, bit B3 could comprise bit six from the roll sub-group 91, bit B2 could comprise bit four from the roll sub-group 91, and so forth. In such a case, bit B7 would then comprise bit seven from the roll sub-group 91, bit B6 would comprise bit five from the roll sub-group 91, and so forth.
Referring again to FIG. 8, in this embodiment, the “B7, B6, B5, B4” values from the corresponding recovery indicator are used in conjunction with one or more lookup tables to determine a data bit order pattern to use with respect to formatting the data as comprises the second portion 82 of the joint message 80. Similarly, the “B3, B2, B1, B0” values are used in conjunction with a lookup table to determine a data bit order pattern to also use with that second portion 82 of the joint message 80.
Before providing further elaboration regarding an illustrative example of such lookup tables and their use, it will be helpful to first note that, in this example, the data in the second portion 82 of the joint message comprises 10 bits from roll group F (or H) and 10 bits each from fixed group A (or C) and fixed group B (or D) for a total of 30 bits. These bits are organized into triplets (shown in FIG. 8 in the form “(F, B, A)” and “(H, D, C)” to indicate that each such triplet includes one bit from a roll group F or H and one bit each from the two fixed groups B and A or D and C.
Those skilled in the art will note that, in this illustrative example, bits from roll group E 74A and roll group G 74C are not present in the second portion 82 of the joint message 80. This is because, in this example, it is presumed that the contents of these two roll groups are used to form the recovery indicators that appear in the first portion 81 of the joint message 80. Other accommodations can of course be made in this regard. In general, however, these teachings will accommodate not including those encrypted rolling code bits that are used as recovery indicators in the second portion 82 of the joint message 80.
In the example shown, the order of the bits in each triplet is “F, B, A” (or “H, D, C” as appropriate). This order is neither arbitrary nor static. Instead, for this particular joint message 80, this order of the bits in each triplet is dictated by the values B7, B6, B5, B4 noted above. In this case, and referring now to FIG. 10, a lookup table 101 serves to correlate various values for these two bit pairs with corresponding data bit order patterns. In this example, presuming that the values of these four bits happens to be “0000,” the corresponding order of bits for each triplet is established as “F/H, B/D, A/C” and hence the ordering of the bits depicted in FIG. 8.
Those skilled in the art will note that this lookup table 101 provides no patterns that would correlate to two bit pairs having the value “11.” This is because, in this embodiment, “11” as a bit pair value comprises an illegal value and hence is not expected to occur. Accordingly there are no bit order patterns presented to correlate with such values as “11XX,” “XX11,” or “1111.” This creates 9 possible selections for the order of bits and the inversion value. The number of possible unique order of three bits leads to only six different bit order patterns. This degree of diversity should suffice for most if not all purposes.
The aforementioned B3, B2, B1, B0 values 81F are employed in a similar fashion with this lookup table 101 to identify a particular inversion pattern to be employed with the data triplets of the second portion 82 of the joint message 80. For example, when these bits are “0000,” this lookup table provides for no inversion of any of the bits in each triplet. On the other hand, when these bits are “1010,” each bit of each triplet is to be inverted. In this case, up to eight different inversion patterns are possible.
To illustrate further, when a given data triplet happens to have the values “110” and the inversion indicator has the values “0100,” the lookup table will return a data inversion pattern of “normal invert invert.” As a result, this particular data triplet will instead have the values “101” because the second and third values in each triplet are now to be inverted in value.
So configured, a first portion of a joint message is seen to include a recovery indicator that itself comprises a selected portion of an encrypted rolling code. A second portion of that joint message, in turn, contains data triplets having bits that are arranged in a particular order and that observe a particular inversion pattern as a function of that joint indicator. Accordingly, it will not be sufficient for an unauthorized party to simply glean, in some fashion, the basis of the rolling code itself. Instead, now, this unauthorized party must also now understand how a particular portion of that rolling code is used to modify the transmission of other portions of that rolling code in addition to fixed information as may also accompany the rolling code.
In many application settings it may be desirable to present more than one such joint message to present a complete transmission. For example, and referring now to FIG. 11, it may be desirable to use two (or more) such joint messages 80A and 80B in order to present the complete rolling code and the complete fixed content and was described above. In such a case, for example, the first joint message 80A can present and use a first roll sub-group 91 as defined above as a recovery identifier (which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group E 74A) while the second joint message 80B presents and uses a second, different roll sub-group B 91 (which comprises, in this illustrative example, roll group G 74C) for this purpose. These recovery identifiers can be used as just described to control modification of their corresponding data. So configured, in this illustrative example, 10 bits of roll group F 74B, 10 bits of fixed group A 75A, and 10 bits of fixed group B 75B have their bits ordered and inverted as a function of the bits of roll group E 74A while 10 bits of roll group H 74D, 10 bits of fixed group C 75C, and 10 bits of fixed group D 75D are similarly ordered/inverted as a function of the bits of roll group G 74C.
If desired, these joint messages 80A and 80B can be sent in a concatenated manner. By another approach, however, these joint messages can be separated by at least a minimal amount of silence (achieved, for example, by not transmitting during this period of time). For example, 75 milliseconds or so of blank time can be used for this purpose. So configured, a receiver that receives a second joint message prior to this period of blank time expiring can conclude that one or both of the received messages is somehow in error and should be avoided.
As noted above, in some cases it may be useful to transmit an additional amount of data or information than that specifically provided above. For example, it may be useful to transmit additional data that represents a particular instruction, status information, or the like. Such additional information can be readily accommodated by the teachings set forth above. To illustrate, and referring now to FIG. 12, 32 bits of such additional data can be subdivided into four corresponding data groups I and J 122A and 122B and K and L 122C and 122D where each such data group has eight bits.
Referring now to FIG. 13, the second portion 82 of each joint message 80 can now comprise 54 bits. By one approach, this can comprise 8 bits for a repeated presentation of the same rolling code group E or G as comprises the recovery identifier, 10 bits each for rolling code group F or H, fixed group A or C, and fixed group B or D, as well as 8 bits each for data group I or K and data group J or L as are described above. These various bits are again combined into data triplets using a group selection pattern such as that illustrated in FIG. 13. And, once again, the recovery identifier comprised of the roll group presented in the first portion 81 of the joint message 80 is used to select from a lookup table(s) the particular bit order and inversion patterns to employ with respect to these data triplets. In this case, and referring now to FIG. 14, the lookup table 141 can include specific bit order patterns that apply in different ways depending upon whether the data triplet includes the supplemental data.
In some cases, it may be necessary or appropriate to transmit even a larger quantity of data than can be accommodated by the processes and techniques described above. In such a case, if desired, additional supplemental joint messages can be used to present such supplemental data. With reference to FIG. 15, 32 bit value data elements 151 can be parsed using an application defined algorithm 152 of choice as corresponds to the data itself (or as may be otherwise provided or selected) into four ternary bit pairs 153 and three data groups of N bits each 154A-154C.
Referring now to FIG. 16, the recovery indicator can be reused from a previous related joint message and the second portion 82 of the joint message 80 can contain 3 to the Nth power bits as necessary to accommodate the full data payload. The three data groups A-C are then used to form corresponding data triplets. And, as before, the recovery identifier is used to extract from a corresponding lookup table (such as the lookup table 171 presented in FIG. 17) the particular bit order pattern and bit inversion pattern to employ with respect to the transmission of these data triplets.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the above-described processes are readily enabled using any of a wide variety of available and/or readily configured platforms, including partially or wholly programmable platforms as are known in the art or dedicated purpose platforms as may be desired for some applications. Referring now to FIG. 18, an illustrative approach to such a platform will now be provided.
In this illustrative embodiment, the apparatus 180 (which may comprise, for example, a wireless remote control transmitter) comprises a processor 181 that couples to a transmitter 182 (such as a wireless transmitter) of choice. Both of these components then also operably couple to a first memory 183, a second memory 184, a first lookup table 185, and a second lookup table 186. The first memory 183 can have a fixed value stored therein. This fixed value can comprise, for example, information that substantially uniquely identifies this particular apparatus 180. This first memory 183 may also, if desired, have a plurality of different fixed values contained therein. This would permit storing, for example, remote control signals that are not specific (i.e., unique) to the apparatus 180 itself.
The second memory 184 can have the aforementioned encrypted rolling code stored therein. By one approach, the processor 181 is configured and arranged to calculate the encrypted rolling code when needed and to temporarily buffer that value in the second memory 184 pending actual use of that information. By another approach, the encrypted rolling code information can be pre-provisioned using a derivation and storage approach of choice.
The lookup tables 185 and 186 are the lookup tables described above. For example, the first lookup table 185 can comprise the lookup table that correlates a first plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding differing data bit order patterns. Similarly, the second lookup table 186 can comprise the lookup table that correlates a second plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding different data inversion patterns.
The processor 181 itself is configured and arranged (via, for example, appropriate programming) to carry out selected teachings as have been presented above. So configured, for example, the processor 181 can be configured and arranged to use the encrypted rolling code to select ones of the particular data bit order patterns and data inversion patterns for the transmitter 182 to use as transmission characteristics when transmitting the fixed value and at least portions of the encrypted rolling code. In particular, if desired, the processor can use a first part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a first part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value and a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value.
Those skilled in the art will recognize and understand that such an apparatus 180 may be comprised of a plurality of physically distinct elements as is suggested by the illustration shown in FIG. 18. It is also possible, however, to view this illustration as comprising a logical view, in which case one or more of these elements can be enabled and realized via a shared platform and/or a more-widely-distributed platform. It will also be understood that such a shared platform may comprise a wholly or at least partially programmable platform as are known in the art.
So configured, those skilled in the art will recognize and appreciate that these teachings offer great flexibility and opportunity with respect to further protecting information during a wireless transmission of that information. These teachings have particular relevance to transmissions of rolling codes and offer particular advantages when also used in conjunction with the transmission of fixed information in addition to rolling code information. The particular transmission characteristics presented are largely compatible for use with a wide variety of wireless modulation techniques. Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that these teachings are highly compatible for use with binary-based representations of ternary data formats.
Those skilled in the art will recognize that a wide variety of modifications, alterations, and combinations can be made with respect to the above described embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, and that such modifications, alterations, and combinations are to be viewed as being within the ambit of the inventive concept.

Claims (34)

We claim:
1. A method comprising:
providing an encrypted rolling code;
providing a plurality of differing data bit order patterns;
providing a plurality of differing data inversion patterns;
selecting a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide selected patterns;
transmitting at least a part of the encrypted rolling code using the selected patterns as transmission characteristics,
wherein selecting a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide selected patterns comprises using the rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the encrypted rolling code comprises a plurality of bit pairs.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein the differing data bit order patterns each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits.
4. The method of claim 1 wherein the differing data inversion patterns each comprise a pattern for exactly three bits.
5. The method of claim 1 wherein:
providing a plurality of differing data bit order patterns comprises providing at least six different bit order patterns; and
providing a plurality of differing data inversion patterns comprises providing at least eight different data inversion patterns.
6. The method of claim 1 wherein using the encrypted rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns comprises using a predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns.
7. The method of claim 6 wherein using a predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns comprises using a predetermined four bit pairs of the encrypted rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns.
8. The method of claim 6 wherein using a predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select the particular data bit order pattern and data inversion pattern to provide the selected patterns further comprises:
using a first predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select a first particular data bit order pattern and a first data inversion pattern to provide first selected patterns; and
using a second predetermined portion of the encrypted rolling code to select a second particular data bit order pattern and a second data inversion pattern to provide second selected patterns;
wherein the first and second predetermined portions of the encrypted rolling code are discrete from one another.
9. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
providing a fixed code;
and wherein transmitting at least a part of the encrypted rolling code using the selected patterns as transmission characteristics further comprises transmitting at least a part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed code using the selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
10. A method to facilitate transmitting a remote control message comprising:
providing a fixed message having at least a first and second part;
providing an encrypted rolling code having at least a first, second, third, and fourth part;
providing a plurality of differing data bit order patterns;
providing a plurality of differing data inversion patterns;
using the first part of the encrypted rolling code to select a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide first selected patterns;
using the second part of the encrypted rolling code to select a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide second selected patterns;
transmitting:
the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics; the second part of the fixed message and the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
11. The method of claim 10 wherein transmitting further comprises:
transmitting the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code without using either the first or second selected patterns as transmission characteristics to thereby provide recovery identifiers to be used when recovering at a receiver the first and second parts of the fixed message and the third and fourth parts of the encrypted rolling code.
12. The method of claim 11 wherein the first and second parts of the encrypted rolling code each comprise four bit pairs.
13. The method of claim 12 wherein
using the first part of the encrypted rolling code to select a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide first selected patterns comprises using two bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the first part of the encrypted rolling code and a first lookup table to correlate the two bit pairs to a corresponding data bit order pattern and using a different two bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the first part of the encrypted rolling code and a second lookup table to correlate the different two bit pairs to a corresponding data inversion pattern;
using the second part of the encrypted rolling code to select a particular one of each of the data bit order patterns and the data inversion patterns to provide second selected patterns comprises using two bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the second part of the encrypted rolling code and the first lookup table to correlate the two bit pairs to a corresponding data bit order pattern and using a different two bit pairs of the four bit pairs as comprise the second part of the encrypted rolling code and the second lookup table to correlate the different two bit pairs to a corresponding data inversion pattern.
14. The method of claim 13 wherein transmitting comprises transmitting using Manchester encoding.
15. The method of claim 14 wherein transmitting further comprises:
transmitting the second part of the fixed message and the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics only after not transmitting for at least a predetermined period of time following transmission of the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
16. The method of claim 15 wherein the predetermined period of time comprises about 75 milliseconds.
17. The method of claim 10 wherein the fixed message comprises a value that is substantially unique to a given transmitter and therefore serves to identify the given transmitter.
18. The method of claim 17 further comprising:
providing a data payload that is not substantially unique to
the given transmitter; and wherein transmitting:
the first part of the fixed message and the third part of the encrypted rolling code using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics;
the second part of the fixed message and the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics; further comprises:
transmitting:
the first part of the fixed message, the third part of the encrypted rolling code, and a first part of the data payload using the first selected patterns as transmission characteristics;
the second part of the fixed message, the fourth part of the encrypted rolling code, and a second part of the data payload using the second selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
19. The method of claim 18 wherein the data payload comprises a movable barrier operator remote control signal.
20. The method of claim 19 wherein transmitting further comprises transmitting a remaining part of the data payload using one of the selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
21. An apparatus comprising:
a first memory having a fixed value stored therein;
a second memory having an encrypted rolling code stored therein;
a first lookup table that correlates a first plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding differing data bit order patterns;
a second lookup table that correlates a second plurality of different encrypted rolling code values with corresponding differing data inversion patterns;
a processor that is operably coupled to the first and second memory and the first and second lookup table and that is configured and arranged to use the encrypted rolling code to select ones of the particular data bit order patterns and data inversion patterns to provide selected patterns;
a transmitter operably coupled to the first and second memory and to the processor and being configured and arranged to transmit at least a part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value using the selected patterns as transmission characteristics.
22. The apparatus of claim 21 wherein the apparatus comprises a movable barrier operator wireless remote control.
23. The apparatus of claim 21 wherein the processor is further configured and arranged to use:
a first part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a first part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value; and
a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code to select a data bit order pattern and a data inversion pattern to use when transmitting a second, different part of the encrypted rolling code and the fixed value.
24. The apparatus of claim 21 wherein the fixed value comprises at least one of:
a substantially unique identifier for the apparatus;
a remote control signal that is not specific to the apparatus.
25. The apparatus of claim 24 wherein the fixed value comprises both of the substantially unique identifier for the apparatus and the remote control signal that is not specific to the apparatus.
26. A method for use with a receiver that is configured and arranged to compatibly receive and process a transmitted encrypted rolling code, wherein:
the transmitted encrypted rolling code comprises at least a part thereof that was transmitted using selected patterns of transmission characteristics selected based at least in part on using a rolling code, wherein a first one of the selected patterns comprises a selected particular one of a plurality of differing data bit order patterns and wherein a second one of the selected patterns comprises a selected particular one of a plurality of differing data inversion patterns;
the method comprising:
at a transmitter:
providing a message that will be compatibly received and processed by the receiver as the transmitted encrypted rolling code;
transmitting the message to the receiver.
27. The method of claim 26 wherein providing a message comprises providing a message that comprises, at least in part, a representation of the selected patterns of transmission characteristics.
28. The method of claim 26 wherein transmitting the message to the receiver comprises transmitting the message to the receiver via a wireless connection.
29. The method of claim 1 wherein the providing the encrypted rolling code comprises:
providing ternary data as corresponds to a movable barrier operator;
converting the ternary data to a binary format to provide binary information as at least part of the encrypted rolling code.
30. The method of claim 29 wherein the providing the ternary data comprises providing binary bits of information and converting the binary bits into the ternary data in a way not mirroring the converting the ternary data to the binary format to provide binary information.
31. The method of claim 10 wherein the providing the encrypted rolling code comprises:
providing ternary data as corresponds to a movable barrier operator;
converting the ternary data to a binary format to provide binary information as at least part of the encrypted rolling code.
32. The method of claim 31 wherein the providing the ternary data comprises providing binary bits of information and converting the binary bits into the ternary data in a way not mirroring the converting the ternary data to the binary format to provide binary information.
33. The method of claim 26 further comprising providing the transmitted encrypted rolling code by:
providing ternary data as corresponds to a movable barrier operator;
converting the ternary data to a binary format to provide binary information as at least part of the encrypted rolling code.
34. The method of claim 33 wherein the providing the ternary data comprises providing binary bits of information and converting the binary bits into the ternary data in a way not mirroring the converting the ternary data to the binary format to provide binary information.
US15/674,069 2005-01-27 2017-08-10 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code Active 2029-05-06 USRE48433E1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/674,069 USRE48433E1 (en) 2005-01-27 2017-08-10 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/044,411 US7071850B1 (en) 2005-01-27 2005-01-27 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US11/172,525 US9148409B2 (en) 2005-06-30 2005-06-30 Method and apparatus to facilitate message transmission and reception using different transmission characteristics
US11/480,288 US7561075B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-06-30 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US11/501,455 US8422667B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-08-09 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US15/674,069 USRE48433E1 (en) 2005-01-27 2017-08-10 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US11/501,455 Reissue US8422667B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-08-09 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
USRE48433E1 true USRE48433E1 (en) 2021-02-09

Family

ID=74402158

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/674,069 Active 2029-05-06 USRE48433E1 (en) 2005-01-27 2017-08-10 Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (1) USRE48433E1 (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11799648B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2023-10-24 The Chamberlain Group Llc Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Citations (210)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3906348A (en) 1973-08-20 1975-09-16 Chamberlain Mfg Corp Digital radio control
US4097859A (en) 1976-11-01 1978-06-27 Burroughs Corporation Three-level to two-level decoder
US4178549A (en) 1978-03-27 1979-12-11 National Semiconductor Corporation Recognition of a received signal as being from a particular transmitter
US4243976A (en) 1979-03-12 1981-01-06 The Singer Company Ternary to binary converter
US4255742A (en) 1979-06-07 1981-03-10 Ford Motor Company Data communication code
US4387460A (en) 1979-07-23 1983-06-07 Societe Anonyme De Tele-Communication Supplementary information transmitting arrangement for a digital data transmission system
US4387455A (en) 1981-06-18 1983-06-07 Nira Schwartz Apparatus and method for transmission of communications
US4468787A (en) 1981-11-09 1984-08-28 Lear Siegler, Inc. Ternary data transmission system
US4566044A (en) 1984-10-29 1986-01-21 International Business Machines Corporation Direction-constrained ternary codes using peak and polarity detection
US4677284A (en) 1985-08-22 1987-06-30 Genest Leonard Joseph Multi-access security system
US4720860A (en) 1984-11-30 1988-01-19 Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. Method and apparatus for positively identifying an individual
US4750118A (en) 1985-10-29 1988-06-07 Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation Coding system for multiple transmitters and a single receiver for a garage door opener
US4808995A (en) 1986-05-02 1989-02-28 Stanley Automatic Openers Accessory-expandable, radio-controlled, door operator with multiple security levels
US4829296A (en) 1986-04-30 1989-05-09 Carey S. Clark Electronic lock system
US4850046A (en) 1986-10-30 1989-07-18 Neiman Infrared transmitter of coded message having fixed code and large number of combinations
US4856062A (en) 1984-11-30 1989-08-08 Kenneth Weiss Computing and indicating device
US4885778A (en) 1984-11-30 1989-12-05 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for synchronizing generation of separate, free running, time dependent equipment
US4893338A (en) 1987-12-31 1990-01-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System for conveying information for the reliable authentification of a plurality of documents
US4910750A (en) 1985-12-05 1990-03-20 Stc Plc Data transmission system
US4988990A (en) 1989-05-09 1991-01-29 Rosemount Inc. Dual master implied token communication system
US4988992A (en) 1989-07-27 1991-01-29 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. System for establishing a code and controlling operation of equipment
US5021776A (en) 1988-07-11 1991-06-04 Yale Security Inc. Electronic combination of lock with changeable entry codes, lock-out and programming code
US5091942A (en) 1990-07-23 1992-02-25 Ericsson Ge Mobile Communications Holding, Inc. Authentication system for digital cellular communications
US5136548A (en) 1990-06-07 1992-08-04 Mercedes-Benz Ag Remote-control system for closures
US5150464A (en) 1990-06-06 1992-09-22 Apple Computer, Inc. Local area network device startup process
US5197061A (en) 1990-03-23 1993-03-23 Etat Francais Device for the transmission of digital data with at least two levels of protection and corresponding reception device
US5252960A (en) 1991-08-26 1993-10-12 Stanley Home Automation Secure keyless entry system for automatic garage door operator
US5420925A (en) 1994-03-03 1995-05-30 Lectron Products, Inc. Rolling code encryption process for remote keyless entry system
US5442340A (en) 1988-12-05 1995-08-15 Prince Corporation Trainable RF transmitter including attenuation control
GB2288261A (en) 1994-04-06 1995-10-11 Michael Doxas Remote control radio key
US5517187A (en) 1990-05-29 1996-05-14 Nanoteq (Pty) Limited Microchips and remote control devices comprising same
US5563600A (en) * 1993-06-30 1996-10-08 Alpine Electronics, Inc. Data transmission for remote-controlled security system
US5566359A (en) 1992-06-06 1996-10-15 Corrigan; Nigel Prevention of simultaneous transmitter operation in a ground radio transmitting and receiving apparatus
US5565812A (en) * 1995-03-23 1996-10-15 Texas Instruments Incorporated Increased sensitivity signal shaper circuit to recover a data stream coming from a digitally modulated channel
US5576701A (en) 1990-07-16 1996-11-19 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Remote actuating apparatus comprising keypad controlled transmitter
US5578999A (en) 1993-12-06 1996-11-26 Casio Computer Co., Ltd. Remote control with learning function and confirmation thereof
US5594429A (en) 1993-10-27 1997-01-14 Alps Electric Co., Ltd. Transmission and reception system and signal generation method for same
FR2737373A1 (en) 1995-07-25 1997-01-31 Lafage Marc Transformation of serial digital signals for MIDI computer interfaces - transforms ternary serial signal to two binary signals that are transmitted at an accelerated bit rate one after the other, and adds control data to signals
US5600653A (en) 1994-09-30 1997-02-04 Comsat Corporation Technique for improving asynchronous transfer mode operation over a communications link with bursty bit errors
US5635913A (en) 1990-07-16 1997-06-03 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Remote actuating apparatus with long and short operating codes
US5673017A (en) 1993-09-02 1997-09-30 Astroflex Inc. Remote vehicle starting system
US5686904A (en) 1991-05-29 1997-11-11 Microchip Technology Incorporated Secure self learning system
JPH09322274A (en) 1996-05-29 1997-12-12 Mitsubishi Cable Ind Ltd Remote controller
US5699065A (en) 1996-01-16 1997-12-16 Stanley Home Automation Remote control transmitter and method of operation
US5719619A (en) 1994-10-08 1998-02-17 Sony Corporation Bidirectional broadcasting method, bidirectional broadcasting system and receiver apparatus for bidirectional broadcast
US5774065A (en) * 1994-08-05 1998-06-30 Nippondenso Co., Ltd. Remote control system and method using variable ID code
US5838747A (en) 1995-07-28 1998-11-17 Nec Corporation Asynchronous serial data transmission apparatus with edge interrupt operation and timer interrupt operation
US5942985A (en) 1995-07-25 1999-08-24 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Automatic locking/unlocking device and method using wireless communication
EP0937845A1 (en) 1998-02-24 1999-08-25 f+g megamos Sicherheitselektronik GmbH Releasing system as means of releasing functions
US5949349A (en) 1997-02-19 1999-09-07 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Code responsive radio receiver capable of operation with plural types of code transmitters
AU710682B2 (en) 1995-05-17 1999-09-30 Chamberlain Group, Inc., The Rolling code security system
US6012144A (en) 1996-10-08 2000-01-04 Pickett; Thomas E. Transaction security method and apparatus
WO2000010301A2 (en) 1998-10-13 2000-02-24 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Signalling transmission using phase rotation techniques in a digital communications system
WO2000010302A1 (en) 1998-08-15 2000-02-24 Roke Manor Research Limited Programmable packet header processor
US6049289A (en) 1996-09-06 2000-04-11 Overhead Door Corporation Remote controlled garage door opening system
US6052408A (en) 1995-09-06 2000-04-18 Aironet Wireless Communications, Inc. Cellular communication system with dynamically modified data transmission parameters
US6070154A (en) 1998-11-27 2000-05-30 Activepoint Ltd. Internet credit card security
US6094575A (en) 1993-11-01 2000-07-25 Omnipoint Corporation Communication system and method
EP1024626A1 (en) 1999-01-27 2000-08-02 International Business Machines Corporation Method, apparatus, and communication system for exchange of information in pervasive environments
US6157719A (en) 1995-04-03 2000-12-05 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Conditional access system
US6175312B1 (en) 1990-05-29 2001-01-16 Microchip Technology Incorporated Encoder and decoder microchips and remote control devices for secure unidirectional communication
US6181255B1 (en) 1997-02-27 2001-01-30 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Multi-frequency radio frequency transmitter with code learning capability
US6243000B1 (en) 1998-02-13 2001-06-05 Philip Y. W. Tsui Wireless rolling code security system
US20010023483A1 (en) 2000-02-08 2001-09-20 Shoichi Kiyomoto Method of securely transmitting information
US20020034303A1 (en) 2000-01-21 2002-03-21 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US6414986B1 (en) 1998-08-24 2002-07-02 Sony Corporation Method and system for radio communication
US6414587B1 (en) 1998-03-13 2002-07-02 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Code learning system for a movable barrier operator
EP1223700A1 (en) 2001-01-10 2002-07-17 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. MC-CDMA transmission system and method with adaptive mapping
US6456726B1 (en) 1999-10-26 2002-09-24 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Methods and apparatus for multi-layer data hiding
US20020184504A1 (en) 2001-03-26 2002-12-05 Eric Hughes Combined digital signature
US6496477B1 (en) 1999-07-09 2002-12-17 Texas Instruments Incorporated Processes, articles, and packets for network path diversity in media over packet applications
US20020191785A1 (en) 2001-06-14 2002-12-19 International Business Machines Corporation Apparatus and method for encrypting and decrypting data with incremental data validation
WO2003010656A2 (en) 2001-07-26 2003-02-06 Kyocera Wireless Corporation System and method for executing update instructions on a wireless communications device
US6535544B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2003-03-18 Andrzej Partyka Frequency hopping system for intermittent transmission
US20030056001A1 (en) 2001-07-20 2003-03-20 Ashutosh Mate Selective routing of data flows using a TCAM
US20030070092A1 (en) 2001-10-09 2003-04-10 Philip Hawkes Method and apparatus for security in a data processing system
US6549949B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-04-15 Accenture Llp Fixed format stream in a communication services patterns environment
US20030072445A1 (en) 2001-10-17 2003-04-17 Kuhlman Douglas A. Method of scrambling and descrambling data in a communication system
EP1313260A2 (en) 2001-11-16 2003-05-21 Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. Apparatus and method for multicast data
US20030147536A1 (en) 2002-02-05 2003-08-07 Andivahis Dimitrios Emmanouil Secure electronic messaging system requiring key retrieval for deriving decryption keys
US20030177237A1 (en) 1999-05-07 2003-09-18 Recording Industry Association Of America Content authorization system over networks including the internet and method for transmitting same
WO2003079607A1 (en) 2002-03-18 2003-09-25 Colin Martin Schmidt Session key distribution methods using a hierarchy of key servers
US20030191949A1 (en) 2000-08-30 2003-10-09 Akihiro Odagawa Authentication system, authentication request device, validating device and service medium
US6640244B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-28 Accenture Llp Request batcher in a transaction services patterns environment
US20030227370A1 (en) 2002-06-06 2003-12-11 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Universal barrier operator transmitter
US20040019783A1 (en) 2002-07-24 2004-01-29 Hawkes Philip Michael Fast encryption and authentication for data processing systems
US6688518B1 (en) 2002-01-31 2004-02-10 Anthony Valencia Wall-mounted touch screen information system
US6690796B1 (en) 1995-05-17 2004-02-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US6697379B1 (en) 1998-05-18 2004-02-24 Inria Institut National De Recherche En Informatique Et En Automatique System for transmitting messages to improved stations, and corresponding processing
US20040081075A1 (en) 2002-10-18 2004-04-29 Kazuaki Tsukakoshi Code modulation adaptive and variable multiplexing transmission method and code modulation adaptive and variable multiplexing transmission apparatus
EP1421728A1 (en) 2001-08-09 2004-05-26 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
US6754266B2 (en) 1998-10-09 2004-06-22 Microsoft Corporation Method and apparatus for use in transmitting video information over a communication network
US20040174856A1 (en) 2001-07-13 2004-09-09 Jerome Brouet Method for transporting real-time data on a radio packet communication network
US20040179485A1 (en) 2003-03-12 2004-09-16 Terrier Carl M. Method of transmitting and receiving two-way serial digital signals in a wireless network utilizing a simplified baseband processor
US20040181569A1 (en) 2003-03-13 2004-09-16 Attar Rashid Ahmed Method and system for a data transmission in a communication system
US6829357B1 (en) 1999-12-14 2004-12-07 Trw Inc. Communication system having a transmitter and a receiver that engage in reduced size encrypted data communication
US6850910B1 (en) 1999-10-22 2005-02-01 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Active data hiding for secure electronic media distribution
US20050053022A1 (en) 2003-08-28 2005-03-10 The Boeing Company Encoding and merging multiple data streams of fibre channel network
US20050058153A1 (en) 2003-09-15 2005-03-17 John Santhoff Common signaling method
US20050101314A1 (en) 2003-11-10 2005-05-12 Uri Levi Method and system for wireless group communications
US20050174242A1 (en) 2004-02-02 2005-08-11 Mobile Reach Media Inc. Monitoring method and system
US6930983B2 (en) 2000-03-15 2005-08-16 Texas Instruments Incorporated Integrated circuits, systems, apparatus, packets and processes utilizing path diversity for media over packet applications
US6956460B2 (en) 2002-01-15 2005-10-18 Tsui Philip Y W Transmitter for operating rolling code receivers
US6963561B1 (en) 2000-12-15 2005-11-08 Atrica Israel Ltd. Facility for transporting TDM streams over an asynchronous ethernet network using internet protocol
US6980518B1 (en) 2000-06-23 2005-12-27 International Business Machines Corporation Gossip-based reliable multicast message recovery system and method
US20050285719A1 (en) 2004-06-24 2005-12-29 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus to manage reverse data flow in a high throughput wireless network
US6998977B2 (en) 2003-04-28 2006-02-14 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for monitoring a movable barrier over a network
EP1625560A1 (en) 2003-05-20 2006-02-15 Rib S.r.l. Fixed and variable code radio system
US7002490B2 (en) 2003-09-09 2006-02-21 Ternarylogic Llc Ternary and higher multi-value digital scramblers/descramblers
US20060083187A1 (en) 2004-10-18 2006-04-20 Mobile (R&D) Ltd. Pairing system and method for wirelessly connecting communication devices
US7039809B1 (en) 1998-11-12 2006-05-02 Mastercard International Incorporated Asymmetric encrypted pin
US7039397B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-05-02 Lear Corporation User-assisted programmable appliance control
US7042363B2 (en) 2003-04-02 2006-05-09 General Motors Corporation Methods and apparatus for producing a three-state single wire control
US7050479B1 (en) 2000-05-12 2006-05-23 The Titan Corporation System for, and method of, providing frequency hopping
US7057547B2 (en) 2002-05-21 2006-06-06 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Mounted remote control unit with plug-in module interface
US7068181B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-06-27 Lear Corporation Programmable appliance remote control
US7071850B1 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-07-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US7088706B2 (en) 1999-06-30 2006-08-08 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for measuring latency of a computer network
US7088218B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-08-08 Lear Corporation Wireless appliance activation transceiver
US20060176171A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-08-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Alarm system interaction with a movable barrier operator method and apparatus
US7139398B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2006-11-21 Sony Corporation Time division partial encryption
US20070006319A1 (en) 2005-06-30 2007-01-04 Fitzgibbon James J Method and apparatus to facilitate message transmission and reception using multiple forms of message alteration
US20070005806A1 (en) 2005-06-30 2007-01-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate message transmission and reception using defferent transmission characteristics
US7161466B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2007-01-09 Lear Corporation Remote control automatic appliance activation
EP1760985A2 (en) 2005-08-31 2007-03-07 Assa Abloy Identification Technology Group AB Device authentication using a unidirectional protocol
US20070058811A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2007-03-15 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20070245147A1 (en) 2006-04-17 2007-10-18 Katsuyuki Okeya Message authentication code generating device, message authentication code verification device, and message authentication system
US7298721B2 (en) 2000-02-02 2007-11-20 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Single-carrier/DS-CDMA packet transmitting method, uplink packet transmitting method in multi carrier/DS-CDMA mobile communication system, and structure of downlink channel in multi carrier/DS-CDMA mobile communication system
US7301900B1 (en) 2001-05-24 2007-11-27 Vixs Systems Inc Method and apparatus for hub-based network access via a multimedia system
EP1865656A1 (en) 2006-06-08 2007-12-12 BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS public limited company Provision of secure communications connection using third party authentication
US7333615B1 (en) 2002-06-26 2008-02-19 At&T Delaware Intellectual Property, Inc. Encryption between multiple devices
US7346163B2 (en) 2003-10-31 2008-03-18 Sony Corporation Dynamic composition of pre-encrypted video on demand content
CA2177410C (en) 1995-06-27 2008-04-01 Kurt A. Dykema Trainable transceiver capable of learning variable codes
US7353499B2 (en) 2003-09-25 2008-04-01 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Multiple instruction dispatch tables for application program obfuscation
CA2443452C (en) 1995-05-17 2008-07-29 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7406553B2 (en) 2002-09-30 2008-07-29 Marvell International Ltd. System and apparatus for early fixed latency subtractive decoding
US7415618B2 (en) 2003-09-25 2008-08-19 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Permutation of opcode values for application program obfuscation
US20080229400A1 (en) 2003-08-13 2008-09-18 Curicom (Nsw) Pty Ltd Remote Entry System
US7429898B2 (en) 2005-11-09 2008-09-30 Fujifilm Corporation Clock signal generating circuit, semiconductor integrated circuit and method for controlling a frequency division ratio
CA2684658A1 (en) 2007-04-20 2008-10-30 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Method and apparatus for protecting simlock information in an electronic device
AU2008202369A1 (en) 2007-06-08 2009-01-08 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus regarding a movable barrier operator remote control transmitter kit
US7492905B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-02-17 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
CN101399825A (en) 2007-09-29 2009-04-01 华为技术有限公司 Method, device and system for sharing matched pair information between equipments
US7516325B2 (en) 2001-04-06 2009-04-07 Certicom Corp. Device authentication in a PKI
GB2453383A (en) 2007-10-05 2009-04-08 Iti Scotland Ltd Authentication method using a third party
US20090096621A1 (en) 2007-10-11 2009-04-16 Sharp Laboratories Of America, Inc. Systems and methods for configuring notification messages about electronic device conditions
US7535926B1 (en) 2005-01-07 2009-05-19 Juniper Networks, Inc. Dynamic interface configuration for supporting multiple versions of a communication protocol
US7545942B2 (en) 2002-02-14 2009-06-09 Agere Systems Inc. Security key distribution using key rollover strategies for wireless networks
US7548153B2 (en) 2004-07-09 2009-06-16 Tc License Ltd. Multi-protocol or multi-command RFID system
US20090176451A1 (en) 2008-01-04 2009-07-09 Microsoft Corporation Encoded color information facilitating device pairing for wireless communication
US7564827B2 (en) 2001-10-19 2009-07-21 Alcatel-Lucent Usa Inc. Adaptive hybrid retransmission method for wireless communications
US7598855B2 (en) 2005-02-01 2009-10-06 Location Based Technologies, Inc. Apparatus and method for locating individuals and objects using tracking devices
US20090315672A1 (en) 2008-06-18 2009-12-24 Lear Corporation Method of programming a wireless transmitter to a wireless receiver
US7668125B2 (en) 2003-09-09 2010-02-23 Qualcomm Incorporated Incremental redundancy transmission for multiple parallel channels in a MIMO communication system
US20100060413A1 (en) 1999-12-20 2010-03-11 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Garage Door Operator Having Thumbprint Identification System
US20100112979A1 (en) 2008-10-31 2010-05-06 Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. Wireless access device and pairing method
US20100125516A1 (en) 2008-11-14 2010-05-20 Wankmueller John R Methods and systems for secure mobile device initiated payments
US7742501B2 (en) 2004-08-06 2010-06-22 Ipeak Networks Incorporated System and method for higher throughput through a transportation network
US7757021B2 (en) 2004-10-21 2010-07-13 Nxp B.V. Slave bus subscriber for a serial data bus
US7764613B2 (en) 2003-08-14 2010-07-27 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Communication control method and system
US20100199092A1 (en) 2009-02-02 2010-08-05 Apple Inc. Sensor derived authentication for establishing peer-to-peer networks
US20100211779A1 (en) 2009-02-17 2010-08-19 Sundaram Ganapathy S Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
US7786843B2 (en) 2005-04-19 2010-08-31 Johnson Controls Technology Company System and method for training a trainable transmitter and a remote control system receiver
US7839851B2 (en) 2006-12-22 2010-11-23 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Method and apparatus for opportunistic multicasting with coded scheduling in wireless networks
CA2708000A1 (en) 2009-06-18 2010-12-18 Arvato Digital Services Canada, Inc. System, apparatus and method for license key permutation
US20110051927A1 (en) 2009-08-27 2011-03-03 Nxp B.V. Device for generating a message authentication code for authenticating a message
US7999656B2 (en) 2005-10-26 2011-08-16 Sentrilock, Llc Electronic lock box with key presence sensing
US8014377B2 (en) 2004-06-24 2011-09-06 Nortel Networks Limited Efficient location updates, paging and short bursts
US20110296185A1 (en) 2010-05-28 2011-12-01 Cisco Technology, Inc. Protection of Control Plane Traffic Against Replayed and Delayed Packet Attack
CA2742018A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-24 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate wireline transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20110317835A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Laird Edward T Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Wireline Transmission of an Encrypted Rolling Code
US20110320803A1 (en) 2010-06-29 2011-12-29 Karl Georg Hampel Light-weight security solution for host-based mobility & multihoming protocols
US20110316668A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Laird Edward T Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Message Transmission and Reception Via Wireline Using Different Transmission Characteristics
US20110316688A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Honeywell International Inc. Alarm management system having an escalation strategy
US20120054493A1 (en) 2010-08-30 2012-03-01 Apple Inc. Secure wireless link between two devices using probes
US8130079B2 (en) 2007-08-15 2012-03-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Methods, systems, and products for discovering electronic devices
EP2437212A1 (en) 2009-11-27 2012-04-04 Eazybreak Oy A system enabling mobile payment of a service
AU2011218848A1 (en) 2010-02-25 2012-09-13 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for training a learning movable barrier operator transceiver
US8276185B2 (en) 2005-01-19 2012-09-25 Micron Technology, Inc. Enhanced security memory access method and architecture
US8290465B2 (en) 2007-02-02 2012-10-16 Lg Electronics Inc. Method of transmitting and receiving a message associated with power saving mode in a wireless communication system
US20120297681A1 (en) 2011-05-24 2012-11-29 Krupke Leroy G Multiple speed profiles in barrier operator systems
US8452267B2 (en) 2009-11-27 2013-05-28 Eazybreak Oy System and method for granting access to a system
US8463540B2 (en) 2005-03-18 2013-06-11 Gatekeeper Systems, Inc. Two-way communication system for tracking locations and statuses of wheeled vehicles
US8544523B2 (en) 2001-07-10 2013-10-01 Overhead Door Corporation Automatic barrier operator system
US20130268333A1 (en) 2012-04-04 2013-10-10 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to process transactions and offers via a gateway
US20130272520A1 (en) 2010-12-28 2013-10-17 National University Corporation Nara Institute Of Method of generating key
US8581695B2 (en) 2009-05-27 2013-11-12 Grant B. Carlson Channel-switching remote controlled barrier opening system
US8615562B1 (en) 2006-12-29 2013-12-24 Google Inc. Proxy for tolerating faults in high-security systems
US8634777B2 (en) 2011-09-26 2014-01-21 Broadcom Corporation Pairing with directional code sequence
US8645708B2 (en) 1999-02-25 2014-02-04 Cidway Technologies, Ltd. Method and apparatus for the secure identification of the owner of a portable device
US8699704B2 (en) 2010-01-13 2014-04-15 Entropic Communications, Inc. Secure node admission in a communication network
US20140169247A1 (en) 2012-12-12 2014-06-19 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for improved communication on a wireless network
US8760267B2 (en) 2006-08-28 2014-06-24 Gentex Corporation System and method for enrollment of a remotely controlled device in a trainable transmitter
US8787823B2 (en) 2005-09-19 2014-07-22 Lojack Corporation Recovery system with repeating communication capabilities
US8830925B2 (en) 2008-08-08 2014-09-09 Lg Electronics Inc. Method of reporting channel quality information in a wireless communication system
US8836469B2 (en) 2010-10-15 2014-09-16 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to accommodate both a learn mode of operation and a pairing mode of operation during a relationship-establishment mode of operation
US20140289528A1 (en) 2013-03-22 2014-09-25 Davit Baghdasaryan System and method for privacy-enhanced data synchronization
EP2800403A1 (en) 2013-05-03 2014-11-05 Now 2 Now Limited Communication tag, system and method
US9082293B2 (en) 2006-09-14 2015-07-14 Crown Equipment Corporation Systems and methods of remotely controlling a materials handling vehicle
US20150222517A1 (en) 2014-02-05 2015-08-06 Apple Inc. Uniform communication protocols for communication between controllers and accessories
US9124424B2 (en) 2009-06-18 2015-09-01 Arvato Digital Services Llc System, apparatus and method for license key permutation
US9142064B2 (en) 2013-08-07 2015-09-22 Zf Friedrichshafen Ag System for detecting vehicle driving mode and method of conducting the same
US9160408B2 (en) 2010-10-11 2015-10-13 Sunpower Corporation System and method for establishing communication with an array of inverters
US20150358814A1 (en) 2014-02-03 2015-12-10 Empire Technology Development Llc Encrypted communication between paired devices
US9280704B2 (en) 2013-06-12 2016-03-08 The Code Corporation Communicating wireless pairing information for pairing an electronic device to a host system
US9317983B2 (en) 2012-03-14 2016-04-19 Autoconnect Holdings Llc Automatic communication of damage and health in detected vehicle incidents
US9336637B2 (en) 2011-03-17 2016-05-10 Unikey Technologies Inc. Wireless access control system and related methods
US20160198391A1 (en) 2013-08-28 2016-07-07 Agfa Healthcare System and method for communicating data
US9396376B1 (en) 2015-04-30 2016-07-19 International Business Machines Corporation Enhanced quick response codes
US9413453B2 (en) 2013-04-09 2016-08-09 Panasonic Intellectual Property Management Co., Ltd. Wireless communication method and wireless communication system

Patent Citations (267)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3906348A (en) 1973-08-20 1975-09-16 Chamberlain Mfg Corp Digital radio control
US4097859A (en) 1976-11-01 1978-06-27 Burroughs Corporation Three-level to two-level decoder
US4178549A (en) 1978-03-27 1979-12-11 National Semiconductor Corporation Recognition of a received signal as being from a particular transmitter
US4243976A (en) 1979-03-12 1981-01-06 The Singer Company Ternary to binary converter
US4255742A (en) 1979-06-07 1981-03-10 Ford Motor Company Data communication code
US4387460A (en) 1979-07-23 1983-06-07 Societe Anonyme De Tele-Communication Supplementary information transmitting arrangement for a digital data transmission system
US4387455A (en) 1981-06-18 1983-06-07 Nira Schwartz Apparatus and method for transmission of communications
US4468787A (en) 1981-11-09 1984-08-28 Lear Siegler, Inc. Ternary data transmission system
US4566044A (en) 1984-10-29 1986-01-21 International Business Machines Corporation Direction-constrained ternary codes using peak and polarity detection
US4720860A (en) 1984-11-30 1988-01-19 Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. Method and apparatus for positively identifying an individual
US4856062A (en) 1984-11-30 1989-08-08 Kenneth Weiss Computing and indicating device
US4885778A (en) 1984-11-30 1989-12-05 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for synchronizing generation of separate, free running, time dependent equipment
US4677284A (en) 1985-08-22 1987-06-30 Genest Leonard Joseph Multi-access security system
US4750118A (en) 1985-10-29 1988-06-07 Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation Coding system for multiple transmitters and a single receiver for a garage door opener
US4910750A (en) 1985-12-05 1990-03-20 Stc Plc Data transmission system
US4829296A (en) 1986-04-30 1989-05-09 Carey S. Clark Electronic lock system
US4808995A (en) 1986-05-02 1989-02-28 Stanley Automatic Openers Accessory-expandable, radio-controlled, door operator with multiple security levels
US4850046A (en) 1986-10-30 1989-07-18 Neiman Infrared transmitter of coded message having fixed code and large number of combinations
EP0265935B1 (en) 1986-10-30 1991-05-08 Valeo Neiman Infrared transmitter for coded messages using a fixed code and a great number of combination facilities
US4893338A (en) 1987-12-31 1990-01-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System for conveying information for the reliable authentification of a plurality of documents
US5021776A (en) 1988-07-11 1991-06-04 Yale Security Inc. Electronic combination of lock with changeable entry codes, lock-out and programming code
US5442340A (en) 1988-12-05 1995-08-15 Prince Corporation Trainable RF transmitter including attenuation control
US4988990A (en) 1989-05-09 1991-01-29 Rosemount Inc. Dual master implied token communication system
US4988992A (en) 1989-07-27 1991-01-29 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. System for establishing a code and controlling operation of equipment
US5197061A (en) 1990-03-23 1993-03-23 Etat Francais Device for the transmission of digital data with at least two levels of protection and corresponding reception device
US6175312B1 (en) 1990-05-29 2001-01-16 Microchip Technology Incorporated Encoder and decoder microchips and remote control devices for secure unidirectional communication
US5517187A (en) 1990-05-29 1996-05-14 Nanoteq (Pty) Limited Microchips and remote control devices comprising same
US5150464A (en) 1990-06-06 1992-09-22 Apple Computer, Inc. Local area network device startup process
US5136548A (en) 1990-06-07 1992-08-04 Mercedes-Benz Ag Remote-control system for closures
US5576701A (en) 1990-07-16 1996-11-19 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Remote actuating apparatus comprising keypad controlled transmitter
US5635913A (en) 1990-07-16 1997-06-03 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Remote actuating apparatus with long and short operating codes
AU645228B2 (en) 1990-07-23 1994-01-06 Ericsson Inc. Authentication system for digital cellular communications
CA2087722C (en) 1990-07-23 1998-07-14 Paul Wilkinson Dent Authentication system for digital cellular communications
US5091942A (en) 1990-07-23 1992-02-25 Ericsson Ge Mobile Communications Holding, Inc. Authentication system for digital cellular communications
US5686904A (en) 1991-05-29 1997-11-11 Microchip Technology Incorporated Secure self learning system
US5252960A (en) 1991-08-26 1993-10-12 Stanley Home Automation Secure keyless entry system for automatic garage door operator
US5566359A (en) 1992-06-06 1996-10-15 Corrigan; Nigel Prevention of simultaneous transmitter operation in a ground radio transmitting and receiving apparatus
US5563600A (en) * 1993-06-30 1996-10-08 Alpine Electronics, Inc. Data transmission for remote-controlled security system
US5673017A (en) 1993-09-02 1997-09-30 Astroflex Inc. Remote vehicle starting system
US5594429A (en) 1993-10-27 1997-01-14 Alps Electric Co., Ltd. Transmission and reception system and signal generation method for same
US6094575A (en) 1993-11-01 2000-07-25 Omnipoint Corporation Communication system and method
US5578999A (en) 1993-12-06 1996-11-26 Casio Computer Co., Ltd. Remote control with learning function and confirmation thereof
US5420925A (en) 1994-03-03 1995-05-30 Lectron Products, Inc. Rolling code encryption process for remote keyless entry system
GB2288261A (en) 1994-04-06 1995-10-11 Michael Doxas Remote control radio key
US5774065A (en) * 1994-08-05 1998-06-30 Nippondenso Co., Ltd. Remote control system and method using variable ID code
US5600653A (en) 1994-09-30 1997-02-04 Comsat Corporation Technique for improving asynchronous transfer mode operation over a communications link with bursty bit errors
US5719619A (en) 1994-10-08 1998-02-17 Sony Corporation Bidirectional broadcasting method, bidirectional broadcasting system and receiver apparatus for bidirectional broadcast
US5565812A (en) * 1995-03-23 1996-10-15 Texas Instruments Incorporated Increased sensitivity signal shaper circuit to recover a data stream coming from a digitally modulated channel
US6157719A (en) 1995-04-03 2000-12-05 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Conditional access system
US6154544A (en) * 1995-05-17 2000-11-28 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US20090016530A1 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-01-15 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US6810123B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2004-10-26 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
EP0771498B1 (en) 1995-05-17 2007-05-09 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
AU710682B2 (en) 1995-05-17 1999-09-30 Chamberlain Group, Inc., The Rolling code security system
CA2443452C (en) 1995-05-17 2008-07-29 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7412056B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2008-08-12 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
CA2193846C (en) 1995-05-17 2004-02-17 Bradford L. Farris Rolling code security system
US6690796B1 (en) 1995-05-17 2004-02-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US20080297370A1 (en) 1995-05-17 2008-12-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US20090021348A1 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-01-22 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7492905B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-02-17 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7492898B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-02-17 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US8633797B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2014-01-21 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US8194856B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2012-06-05 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7623663B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2009-11-24 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US8233625B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2012-07-31 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US8284021B2 (en) 1995-05-17 2012-10-09 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US20060109978A1 (en) 1995-05-17 2006-05-25 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US20020191794A1 (en) 1995-05-17 2002-12-19 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
CA2177410C (en) 1995-06-27 2008-04-01 Kurt A. Dykema Trainable transceiver capable of learning variable codes
FR2737373A1 (en) 1995-07-25 1997-01-31 Lafage Marc Transformation of serial digital signals for MIDI computer interfaces - transforms ternary serial signal to two binary signals that are transmitted at an accelerated bit rate one after the other, and adds control data to signals
US5942985A (en) 1995-07-25 1999-08-24 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Automatic locking/unlocking device and method using wireless communication
US5838747A (en) 1995-07-28 1998-11-17 Nec Corporation Asynchronous serial data transmission apparatus with edge interrupt operation and timer interrupt operation
US6052408A (en) 1995-09-06 2000-04-18 Aironet Wireless Communications, Inc. Cellular communication system with dynamically modified data transmission parameters
US5699065A (en) 1996-01-16 1997-12-16 Stanley Home Automation Remote control transmitter and method of operation
JPH09322274A (en) 1996-05-29 1997-12-12 Mitsubishi Cable Ind Ltd Remote controller
US6049289A (en) 1996-09-06 2000-04-11 Overhead Door Corporation Remote controlled garage door opening system
US6012144A (en) 1996-10-08 2000-01-04 Pickett; Thomas E. Transaction security method and apparatus
US5949349A (en) 1997-02-19 1999-09-07 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Code responsive radio receiver capable of operation with plural types of code transmitters
US6181255B1 (en) 1997-02-27 2001-01-30 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Multi-frequency radio frequency transmitter with code learning capability
US6535544B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2003-03-18 Andrzej Partyka Frequency hopping system for intermittent transmission
US6243000B1 (en) 1998-02-13 2001-06-05 Philip Y. W. Tsui Wireless rolling code security system
EP0937845A1 (en) 1998-02-24 1999-08-25 f+g megamos Sicherheitselektronik GmbH Releasing system as means of releasing functions
US6414587B1 (en) 1998-03-13 2002-07-02 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Code learning system for a movable barrier operator
US6697379B1 (en) 1998-05-18 2004-02-24 Inria Institut National De Recherche En Informatique Et En Automatique System for transmitting messages to improved stations, and corresponding processing
WO2000010302A1 (en) 1998-08-15 2000-02-24 Roke Manor Research Limited Programmable packet header processor
US6414986B1 (en) 1998-08-24 2002-07-02 Sony Corporation Method and system for radio communication
US6754266B2 (en) 1998-10-09 2004-06-22 Microsoft Corporation Method and apparatus for use in transmitting video information over a communication network
WO2000010301A2 (en) 1998-10-13 2000-02-24 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Signalling transmission using phase rotation techniques in a digital communications system
US7039809B1 (en) 1998-11-12 2006-05-02 Mastercard International Incorporated Asymmetric encrypted pin
US6070154A (en) 1998-11-27 2000-05-30 Activepoint Ltd. Internet credit card security
EP1024626A1 (en) 1999-01-27 2000-08-02 International Business Machines Corporation Method, apparatus, and communication system for exchange of information in pervasive environments
US8645708B2 (en) 1999-02-25 2014-02-04 Cidway Technologies, Ltd. Method and apparatus for the secure identification of the owner of a portable device
US20030177237A1 (en) 1999-05-07 2003-09-18 Recording Industry Association Of America Content authorization system over networks including the internet and method for transmitting same
US7088706B2 (en) 1999-06-30 2006-08-08 Cisco Technology, Inc. Method and apparatus for measuring latency of a computer network
US6496477B1 (en) 1999-07-09 2002-12-17 Texas Instruments Incorporated Processes, articles, and packets for network path diversity in media over packet applications
US6549949B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-04-15 Accenture Llp Fixed format stream in a communication services patterns environment
US6640244B1 (en) 1999-08-31 2003-10-28 Accenture Llp Request batcher in a transaction services patterns environment
US6850910B1 (en) 1999-10-22 2005-02-01 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Active data hiding for secure electronic media distribution
US6456726B1 (en) 1999-10-26 2002-09-24 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Methods and apparatus for multi-layer data hiding
US6829357B1 (en) 1999-12-14 2004-12-07 Trw Inc. Communication system having a transmitter and a receiver that engage in reduced size encrypted data communication
US20100060413A1 (en) 1999-12-20 2010-03-11 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Garage Door Operator Having Thumbprint Identification System
US20020034303A1 (en) 2000-01-21 2002-03-21 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US6980655B2 (en) 2000-01-21 2005-12-27 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Rolling code security system
US7298721B2 (en) 2000-02-02 2007-11-20 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Single-carrier/DS-CDMA packet transmitting method, uplink packet transmitting method in multi carrier/DS-CDMA mobile communication system, and structure of downlink channel in multi carrier/DS-CDMA mobile communication system
US20010023483A1 (en) 2000-02-08 2001-09-20 Shoichi Kiyomoto Method of securely transmitting information
US6930983B2 (en) 2000-03-15 2005-08-16 Texas Instruments Incorporated Integrated circuits, systems, apparatus, packets and processes utilizing path diversity for media over packet applications
US7050479B1 (en) 2000-05-12 2006-05-23 The Titan Corporation System for, and method of, providing frequency hopping
US6980518B1 (en) 2000-06-23 2005-12-27 International Business Machines Corporation Gossip-based reliable multicast message recovery system and method
US20030191949A1 (en) 2000-08-30 2003-10-09 Akihiro Odagawa Authentication system, authentication request device, validating device and service medium
US6963561B1 (en) 2000-12-15 2005-11-08 Atrica Israel Ltd. Facility for transporting TDM streams over an asynchronous ethernet network using internet protocol
EP1223700A1 (en) 2001-01-10 2002-07-17 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. MC-CDMA transmission system and method with adaptive mapping
US20020184504A1 (en) 2001-03-26 2002-12-05 Eric Hughes Combined digital signature
US8661256B2 (en) 2001-04-06 2014-02-25 Certicom Corp. Device authentication in a PKI
US8225094B2 (en) 2001-04-06 2012-07-17 Certicom Corp. Device authentication in a PKI
US7516325B2 (en) 2001-04-06 2009-04-07 Certicom Corp. Device authentication in a PKI
US7301900B1 (en) 2001-05-24 2007-11-27 Vixs Systems Inc Method and apparatus for hub-based network access via a multimedia system
US7336787B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2008-02-26 Sony Corporation Critical packet partial encryption
US7139398B2 (en) 2001-06-06 2006-11-21 Sony Corporation Time division partial encryption
US20020191785A1 (en) 2001-06-14 2002-12-19 International Business Machines Corporation Apparatus and method for encrypting and decrypting data with incremental data validation
US8544523B2 (en) 2001-07-10 2013-10-01 Overhead Door Corporation Automatic barrier operator system
US20040174856A1 (en) 2001-07-13 2004-09-09 Jerome Brouet Method for transporting real-time data on a radio packet communication network
US20030056001A1 (en) 2001-07-20 2003-03-20 Ashutosh Mate Selective routing of data flows using a TCAM
WO2003010656A2 (en) 2001-07-26 2003-02-06 Kyocera Wireless Corporation System and method for executing update instructions on a wireless communications device
US7057494B2 (en) 2001-08-09 2006-06-06 Fitzgibbon James J Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
EP1421728A1 (en) 2001-08-09 2004-05-26 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
US8536977B2 (en) 2001-08-09 2013-09-17 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
CA2456680C (en) 2001-08-09 2011-02-01 James J. Fitzgibbon Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
EP2293478A2 (en) 2001-08-09 2011-03-09 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method for a rolling code learning transmitter
US7741951B2 (en) 2001-08-09 2010-06-22 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for a rolling code learning transmitter
US20030070092A1 (en) 2001-10-09 2003-04-10 Philip Hawkes Method and apparatus for security in a data processing system
US20030072445A1 (en) 2001-10-17 2003-04-17 Kuhlman Douglas A. Method of scrambling and descrambling data in a communication system
US7564827B2 (en) 2001-10-19 2009-07-21 Alcatel-Lucent Usa Inc. Adaptive hybrid retransmission method for wireless communications
EP1313260A2 (en) 2001-11-16 2003-05-21 Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. Apparatus and method for multicast data
US6956460B2 (en) 2002-01-15 2005-10-18 Tsui Philip Y W Transmitter for operating rolling code receivers
US6688518B1 (en) 2002-01-31 2004-02-10 Anthony Valencia Wall-mounted touch screen information system
US20030147536A1 (en) 2002-02-05 2003-08-07 Andivahis Dimitrios Emmanouil Secure electronic messaging system requiring key retrieval for deriving decryption keys
US7545942B2 (en) 2002-02-14 2009-06-09 Agere Systems Inc. Security key distribution using key rollover strategies for wireless networks
WO2003079607A1 (en) 2002-03-18 2003-09-25 Colin Martin Schmidt Session key distribution methods using a hierarchy of key servers
US7057547B2 (en) 2002-05-21 2006-06-06 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Mounted remote control unit with plug-in module interface
US20030227370A1 (en) 2002-06-06 2003-12-11 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Universal barrier operator transmitter
US7333615B1 (en) 2002-06-26 2008-02-19 At&T Delaware Intellectual Property, Inc. Encryption between multiple devices
US20040019783A1 (en) 2002-07-24 2004-01-29 Hawkes Philip Michael Fast encryption and authentication for data processing systems
US7406553B2 (en) 2002-09-30 2008-07-29 Marvell International Ltd. System and apparatus for early fixed latency subtractive decoding
US20040081075A1 (en) 2002-10-18 2004-04-29 Kazuaki Tsukakoshi Code modulation adaptive and variable multiplexing transmission method and code modulation adaptive and variable multiplexing transmission apparatus
US20040179485A1 (en) 2003-03-12 2004-09-16 Terrier Carl M. Method of transmitting and receiving two-way serial digital signals in a wireless network utilizing a simplified baseband processor
US20040181569A1 (en) 2003-03-13 2004-09-16 Attar Rashid Ahmed Method and system for a data transmission in a communication system
US7042363B2 (en) 2003-04-02 2006-05-09 General Motors Corporation Methods and apparatus for producing a three-state single wire control
US6998977B2 (en) 2003-04-28 2006-02-14 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for monitoring a movable barrier over a network
EP1625560A1 (en) 2003-05-20 2006-02-15 Rib S.r.l. Fixed and variable code radio system
US7088218B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-08-08 Lear Corporation Wireless appliance activation transceiver
US7068181B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-06-27 Lear Corporation Programmable appliance remote control
US7855633B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2010-12-21 Lear Corporation Remote control automatic appliance activation
US7050794B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-05-23 Lear Corporation User-assisted programmable appliance control
US7812739B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2010-10-12 Lear Corporation Programmable appliance remote control
US7447498B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2008-11-04 Lear Corporation User-assisted programmable appliance control
US7489922B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2009-02-10 Lear Corporation User-assisted programmable appliance control
US7039397B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2006-05-02 Lear Corporation User-assisted programmable appliance control
US7161466B2 (en) 2003-07-30 2007-01-09 Lear Corporation Remote control automatic appliance activation
US20080229400A1 (en) 2003-08-13 2008-09-18 Curicom (Nsw) Pty Ltd Remote Entry System
US8266442B2 (en) 2003-08-13 2012-09-11 Securicom (Nsw) Pty Ltd Remote entry system
US7764613B2 (en) 2003-08-14 2010-07-27 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Communication control method and system
US20050053022A1 (en) 2003-08-28 2005-03-10 The Boeing Company Encoding and merging multiple data streams of fibre channel network
US7002490B2 (en) 2003-09-09 2006-02-21 Ternarylogic Llc Ternary and higher multi-value digital scramblers/descramblers
US7668125B2 (en) 2003-09-09 2010-02-23 Qualcomm Incorporated Incremental redundancy transmission for multiple parallel channels in a MIMO communication system
US20050058153A1 (en) 2003-09-15 2005-03-17 John Santhoff Common signaling method
US7353499B2 (en) 2003-09-25 2008-04-01 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Multiple instruction dispatch tables for application program obfuscation
US7415618B2 (en) 2003-09-25 2008-08-19 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Permutation of opcode values for application program obfuscation
US7346163B2 (en) 2003-10-31 2008-03-18 Sony Corporation Dynamic composition of pre-encrypted video on demand content
US20050101314A1 (en) 2003-11-10 2005-05-12 Uri Levi Method and system for wireless group communications
US20050174242A1 (en) 2004-02-02 2005-08-11 Mobile Reach Media Inc. Monitoring method and system
US8014377B2 (en) 2004-06-24 2011-09-06 Nortel Networks Limited Efficient location updates, paging and short bursts
US20050285719A1 (en) 2004-06-24 2005-12-29 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus to manage reverse data flow in a high throughput wireless network
US7548153B2 (en) 2004-07-09 2009-06-16 Tc License Ltd. Multi-protocol or multi-command RFID system
US7742501B2 (en) 2004-08-06 2010-06-22 Ipeak Networks Incorporated System and method for higher throughput through a transportation network
US20060083187A1 (en) 2004-10-18 2006-04-20 Mobile (R&D) Ltd. Pairing system and method for wirelessly connecting communication devices
US7757021B2 (en) 2004-10-21 2010-07-13 Nxp B.V. Slave bus subscriber for a serial data bus
US7535926B1 (en) 2005-01-07 2009-05-19 Juniper Networks, Inc. Dynamic interface configuration for supporting multiple versions of a communication protocol
US8276185B2 (en) 2005-01-19 2012-09-25 Micron Technology, Inc. Enhanced security memory access method and architecture
US20130170639A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2013-07-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Transmission of Data Including Conversion of Ternary Data to Binary Data
US7071850B1 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-07-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US20060176171A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-08-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Alarm system interaction with a movable barrier operator method and apparatus
AU2006200340A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2006-08-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US7561075B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2009-07-14 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US20070018861A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2007-01-25 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
US8422667B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2013-04-16 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20070058811A1 (en) 2005-01-27 2007-03-15 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US7598855B2 (en) 2005-02-01 2009-10-06 Location Based Technologies, Inc. Apparatus and method for locating individuals and objects using tracking devices
US8463540B2 (en) 2005-03-18 2013-06-11 Gatekeeper Systems, Inc. Two-way communication system for tracking locations and statuses of wheeled vehicles
EP1875333B1 (en) 2005-04-19 2013-01-16 Johnson Controls Techonology Company System and method for training a trainable transmitter and a remote control system receiver
US7786843B2 (en) 2005-04-19 2010-08-31 Johnson Controls Technology Company System and method for training a trainable transmitter and a remote control system receiver
US20070006319A1 (en) 2005-06-30 2007-01-04 Fitzgibbon James J Method and apparatus to facilitate message transmission and reception using multiple forms of message alteration
US20160021140A1 (en) 2005-06-30 2016-01-21 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Message Transmission and Reception Using Different Transmission Characteristics
US20070005806A1 (en) 2005-06-30 2007-01-04 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate message transmission and reception using defferent transmission characteristics
GB2430115A (en) 2005-06-30 2007-03-14 Chamberlain Group Inc Method and Apparatus For Message Transmission and Reception Using Different Transmission Characteristics.
EP1760985A2 (en) 2005-08-31 2007-03-07 Assa Abloy Identification Technology Group AB Device authentication using a unidirectional protocol
US8787823B2 (en) 2005-09-19 2014-07-22 Lojack Corporation Recovery system with repeating communication capabilities
CA2565505C (en) 2005-10-26 2012-09-25 Sentrilock, Inc. Electronic lock box with key presence sensing
US7999656B2 (en) 2005-10-26 2011-08-16 Sentrilock, Llc Electronic lock box with key presence sensing
US7429898B2 (en) 2005-11-09 2008-09-30 Fujifilm Corporation Clock signal generating circuit, semiconductor integrated circuit and method for controlling a frequency division ratio
US20070245147A1 (en) 2006-04-17 2007-10-18 Katsuyuki Okeya Message authentication code generating device, message authentication code verification device, and message authentication system
EP1865656A1 (en) 2006-06-08 2007-12-12 BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS public limited company Provision of secure communications connection using third party authentication
GB2440816A (en) 2006-08-09 2008-02-13 Chamberlain Group Inc Transmission of an encrypted rolling code
CA2596188C (en) 2006-08-09 2016-07-12 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
AU2007203558B2 (en) 2006-08-09 2014-05-08 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US8760267B2 (en) 2006-08-28 2014-06-24 Gentex Corporation System and method for enrollment of a remotely controlled device in a trainable transmitter
US9082293B2 (en) 2006-09-14 2015-07-14 Crown Equipment Corporation Systems and methods of remotely controlling a materials handling vehicle
US7839851B2 (en) 2006-12-22 2010-11-23 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Method and apparatus for opportunistic multicasting with coded scheduling in wireless networks
US8615562B1 (en) 2006-12-29 2013-12-24 Google Inc. Proxy for tolerating faults in high-security systems
US8290465B2 (en) 2007-02-02 2012-10-16 Lg Electronics Inc. Method of transmitting and receiving a message associated with power saving mode in a wireless communication system
US8209550B2 (en) 2007-04-20 2012-06-26 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Method and apparatus for protecting SIMLock information in an electronic device
EP2149103B1 (en) 2007-04-20 2011-12-21 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) Method and apparatus for protecting simlock information in an electronic device
CA2684658A1 (en) 2007-04-20 2008-10-30 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Method and apparatus for protecting simlock information in an electronic device
CA2631076C (en) 2007-06-08 2013-09-03 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus regarding a movable barrier operator remote control transmitter kit
US8207818B2 (en) 2007-06-08 2012-06-26 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus regarding a movable barrier operator remote control transmitter kit
AU2008202369A1 (en) 2007-06-08 2009-01-08 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus regarding a movable barrier operator remote control transmitter kit
US8130079B2 (en) 2007-08-15 2012-03-06 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Methods, systems, and products for discovering electronic devices
CN101399825A (en) 2007-09-29 2009-04-01 华为技术有限公司 Method, device and system for sharing matched pair information between equipments
GB2453383A (en) 2007-10-05 2009-04-08 Iti Scotland Ltd Authentication method using a third party
US20090096621A1 (en) 2007-10-11 2009-04-16 Sharp Laboratories Of America, Inc. Systems and methods for configuring notification messages about electronic device conditions
US20090176451A1 (en) 2008-01-04 2009-07-09 Microsoft Corporation Encoded color information facilitating device pairing for wireless communication
US20090315672A1 (en) 2008-06-18 2009-12-24 Lear Corporation Method of programming a wireless transmitter to a wireless receiver
US8830925B2 (en) 2008-08-08 2014-09-09 Lg Electronics Inc. Method of reporting channel quality information in a wireless communication system
US20100112979A1 (en) 2008-10-31 2010-05-06 Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. Wireless access device and pairing method
US20100125516A1 (en) 2008-11-14 2010-05-20 Wankmueller John R Methods and systems for secure mobile device initiated payments
US20100125509A1 (en) 2008-11-14 2010-05-20 Kranzley Arthur D Methods and systems for secure mobile device initiated payments using generated image data
US20160261572A1 (en) 2009-01-14 2016-09-08 Entropic Communications, Llc Secure node admission in a communication network
US20100199092A1 (en) 2009-02-02 2010-08-05 Apple Inc. Sensor derived authentication for establishing peer-to-peer networks
US20100211779A1 (en) 2009-02-17 2010-08-19 Sundaram Ganapathy S Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
US8581695B2 (en) 2009-05-27 2013-11-12 Grant B. Carlson Channel-switching remote controlled barrier opening system
US9124424B2 (en) 2009-06-18 2015-09-01 Arvato Digital Services Llc System, apparatus and method for license key permutation
CA2708000A1 (en) 2009-06-18 2010-12-18 Arvato Digital Services Canada, Inc. System, apparatus and method for license key permutation
EP2290872B1 (en) 2009-08-27 2014-06-18 Nxp B.V. Device for generating a message authentication code for authenticating a message
US20110051927A1 (en) 2009-08-27 2011-03-03 Nxp B.V. Device for generating a message authentication code for authenticating a message
US8452267B2 (en) 2009-11-27 2013-05-28 Eazybreak Oy System and method for granting access to a system
EP2437212A1 (en) 2009-11-27 2012-04-04 Eazybreak Oy A system enabling mobile payment of a service
US8699704B2 (en) 2010-01-13 2014-04-15 Entropic Communications, Inc. Secure node admission in a communication network
US8416054B2 (en) 2010-02-25 2013-04-09 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for training a learning movable barrier operator transceiver
CA2790940C (en) 2010-02-25 2014-06-10 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for training a learning movable barrier operator transceiver
AU2011218848A1 (en) 2010-02-25 2012-09-13 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for training a learning movable barrier operator transceiver
US20110296185A1 (en) 2010-05-28 2011-12-01 Cisco Technology, Inc. Protection of Control Plane Traffic Against Replayed and Delayed Packet Attack
US20110316688A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Honeywell International Inc. Alarm management system having an escalation strategy
AU2011202656A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2012-01-19 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate wireline transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20110316668A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Laird Edward T Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Message Transmission and Reception Via Wireline Using Different Transmission Characteristics
CA2742018A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-24 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to facilitate wireline transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20110317835A1 (en) 2010-06-24 2011-12-29 Laird Edward T Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Wireline Transmission of an Encrypted Rolling Code
US20110320803A1 (en) 2010-06-29 2011-12-29 Karl Georg Hampel Light-weight security solution for host-based mobility & multihoming protocols
US20120054493A1 (en) 2010-08-30 2012-03-01 Apple Inc. Secure wireless link between two devices using probes
US9160408B2 (en) 2010-10-11 2015-10-13 Sunpower Corporation System and method for establishing communication with an array of inverters
US8836469B2 (en) 2010-10-15 2014-09-16 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. Method and apparatus to accommodate both a learn mode of operation and a pairing mode of operation during a relationship-establishment mode of operation
US20130272520A1 (en) 2010-12-28 2013-10-17 National University Corporation Nara Institute Of Method of generating key
US9336637B2 (en) 2011-03-17 2016-05-10 Unikey Technologies Inc. Wireless access control system and related methods
US20120297681A1 (en) 2011-05-24 2012-11-29 Krupke Leroy G Multiple speed profiles in barrier operator systems
US8634777B2 (en) 2011-09-26 2014-01-21 Broadcom Corporation Pairing with directional code sequence
US9317983B2 (en) 2012-03-14 2016-04-19 Autoconnect Holdings Llc Automatic communication of damage and health in detected vehicle incidents
US20130268333A1 (en) 2012-04-04 2013-10-10 Visa International Service Association Systems and methods to process transactions and offers via a gateway
US20140169247A1 (en) 2012-12-12 2014-06-19 Qualcomm Incorporated System and method for improved communication on a wireless network
US20140289528A1 (en) 2013-03-22 2014-09-25 Davit Baghdasaryan System and method for privacy-enhanced data synchronization
US9413453B2 (en) 2013-04-09 2016-08-09 Panasonic Intellectual Property Management Co., Ltd. Wireless communication method and wireless communication system
EP2800403A1 (en) 2013-05-03 2014-11-05 Now 2 Now Limited Communication tag, system and method
US9280704B2 (en) 2013-06-12 2016-03-08 The Code Corporation Communicating wireless pairing information for pairing an electronic device to a host system
US9142064B2 (en) 2013-08-07 2015-09-22 Zf Friedrichshafen Ag System for detecting vehicle driving mode and method of conducting the same
US20160198391A1 (en) 2013-08-28 2016-07-07 Agfa Healthcare System and method for communicating data
US20150358814A1 (en) 2014-02-03 2015-12-10 Empire Technology Development Llc Encrypted communication between paired devices
US20150222517A1 (en) 2014-02-05 2015-08-06 Apple Inc. Uniform communication protocols for communication between controllers and accessories
US9396376B1 (en) 2015-04-30 2016-07-19 International Business Machines Corporation Enhanced quick response codes
US9418326B1 (en) 2015-04-30 2016-08-16 International Business Machines Corporation Enhanced quick response codes

Non-Patent Citations (237)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
Abrams, and Podell, ‘Tutorial Computer and Network Security,’ District of Columbia: IEEE, 1987. pp. 1075-1081.
Abrams, and Podell, 'Tutorial Computer and Network Security,' District of Columbia: IEEE, 1987. pp. 1075-1081.
Abramson, Norman. ‘The Aloha System—Another alternative for computer communications,’ pp. 281-285, University of Hawaii, 1970.
Abramson, Norman. 'The Aloha System-Another alternative for computer communications,' pp. 281-285, University of Hawaii, 1970.
Access Transmitters-Access Security System, pp. 1-2, htpp://www.webercreations.com/access/security.html, dated Jul. 16, 1997.
Access Transmitters—Access Security System, pp. 1-2, htpp://www.webercreations.com/access/security.html, dated Jul. 16, 1997.
Adams, Russ, Classified, data-scrambling program for Apple II, Info-World, vol. 5, No. 3; Jan. 31, 1988.
Alexi, Werner, et al. ‘RSA and Rabin Functions: Certain Parts Are As Hard As The Whole’, pp. 194-209, Siam Computing, vol. 14, No. 2, Apr. 1988.
Alexi, Werner, et al. 'RSA and Rabin Functions: Certain Parts Are As Hard As The Whole', pp. 194-209, Siam Computing, vol. 14, No. 2, Apr. 1988.
Allianz: Allianz-Zentrum for Technik GmbH-Detailed Requirements for Fulfilling the Specification Profile for Electronically Coded OEM Immobilizers, Issue 22, (Jun. 1994 (Translation Jul. 5, 1994).
Allianz: Allianz-Zentrum for Technik GmbH—Detailed Requirements for Fulfilling the Specification Profile for Electronically Coded OEM Immobilizers, Issue 22, (Jun. 1994 (Translation Jul. 5, 1994).
Anderson, Ross. ‘Searching for the Optium Correlation Attack’, pp. 137-143, Computer Laboratory, Pembroke Street, Cambridge CB2 3QG, Copyright 1995.
Anderson, Ross. 'Searching for the Optium Correlation Attack', pp. 137-143, Computer Laboratory, Pembroke Street, Cambridge CB2 3QG, Copyright 1995.
Arazi, Benjamin, Vehicular Implementations of Public Key Cryptographic Techniques, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 40, No. 3, Aug. 1991, 646-653.
Australian Examiner's First Report on Patent Application No. 2006200340 dated Oct. 16, 2009.
Australian Examiners First Report on Patent Application No. 2006202850 Dated Feb. 25, 2010.
Australian Patent Application No. 2016203457; Examination Report No. 1; dated May 29, 2017.
Australian Patent Application No. 2017265017; First Examination Report dated Oct. 8, 2018; 4 pages.
Australian Patent Examination Report No. 1, Cited in Australian Patent Application No. 2007203558 dated Jan. 15, 2013.
Australian Patent Examination Report No. 1, Cited in Australian Patent Application No. 2014210605 dated May 29, 2015.
Baran, P. Distribution Communications, vol. 9, ‘Security Secrecy and Tamper-free Communications’, Rand Corporation, 1964.
Baran, P. Distribution Communications, vol. 9, 'Security Secrecy and Tamper-free Communications', Rand Corporation, 1964.
Barbaroux, Paul. ‘Uniform Results in. Polynomial-Time Security’, pp. 297-306, Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 92, 1992.
Barbaroux, Paul. 'Uniform Results in. Polynomial-Time Security', pp. 297-306, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 92, 1992.
Barlow, Mike, ‘A Mathematical Word Block Cipher,’ 12 Cryptologia 256-264 (1988).
Barlow, Mike, 'A Mathematical Word Block Cipher,' 12 Cryptologia 256-264 (1988).
Bellovin, S.M. ‘Security Problems in the TCPIIP Protocol Suite’, pp. 32-49, Computer Communication Review, New Jersey, Reprinted from Computer Communication Review, vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 32-48, Apr. 1989.
Bellovin, S.M. 'Security Problems in the TCPIIP Protocol Suite', pp. 32-49, Computer Communication Review, New Jersey, Reprinted from Computer Communication Review, vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 32-48, Apr. 1989.
Beutelspacher, Albrecht. Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 87: ‘Perfect and Essentially Perfect Authentication Schemes’ (Extended Abstract), pp. 167-170, Federal Republic of Germany, Undated.
Beutelspacher, Albrecht. Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 87: 'Perfect and Essentially Perfect Authentication Schemes' (Extended Abstract), pp. 167-170, Federal Republic of Germany, Undated.
Bloch, Gilbert. Enigma Before Ultra Polish Work and The French Contribution, pp. 142-155, Cryptologia 11(3), (Jul. 1987).
British Application No. GB1110709.1; Combined Search and Examination Report Under Sections 17 and 18(3); dated Sep. 29, 2011.
British Combined Search and Examination Report Under Sections 17 and 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB1000541.1; dated Jan. 28, 2010.
British Combined Search and Examination Report Under Sections 17 and 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB1104752.9; dated Apr. 11, 2011.
British Examination Report Under Section 17(5); British Application No. GB0715089.9 Dated Nov. 28, 2007.
British Examination Report Under Section 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB0601795.8; dated Apr. 22, 2009.
British Examination Report Under Section 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated May 6, 2010.
British Examination Report Under Section 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated Nov. 26, 2010.
British Patent Application No. GB1110710.9; Combined Search and Examination Report Under Sections 17 and 18(3); dated Sep. 30, 2011.
British Search Report for Application No. GB0613068.6 Dated Aug. 23, 2006.
British Search Report Under Section 17(5); British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated Oct. 12, 2006.
British Search Report Under Section 17; British Patent Application No. GB0601795.8; dated May 22, 2006.
British Search Report Under Section 17; British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated Aug. 23, 2006.
British Search Report Under Section 17; British Patent Application No. GB0715089.9 dated May 9, 2008.
British Search Report Under Section 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated Oct. 12, 2006.
Canadian Office Action dated Dec. 27, 2017, from corresponding Canadian Patent Application No. 2,926,281.
Canadian Patent Application No. 2,551,295; Office Action dated May 6, 2013.
Canadian Patent Application No. 2,596,188; Canadian Office Action dated Apr. 13, 2015.
Canadian Patent Application No. 2,596,188; Canadian Office Action dated Jan. 15, 2014.
Canadian Patent Application No. 2,926,281, Canadian Office Action dated Dec. 29, 2016.
Combined Search and Examination Reports Under Sections 17 and 18(3); British Patent Application No. GB0920612.9; dated: Dec. 16, 2009.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0601795.8; dated Dec. 16, 2009.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0601795.8; dated Jan. 28, 2010.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0601795.8; dated Sep. 25, 2009.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0613067.8; dated Sep. 9, 2009.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; dated Jan. 31, 2011.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) from British Patent Application No. GB0715089.9 dated Apr. 11, 2011.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0715089.9; dated Sep. 30, 2010.
Examination Report Under Section 18(3) From British Patent Application No. GB0920612.9; dated Jan. 28, 2010.
First Examination Report, from corresponding Austalian Application No. 2019240615; dated Aug. 13, 2020; 4 pages.
Fischer, Elliot. Uncaging the Hagelin Cryptograph, pp. 89-92, Cryptologia, vol. 7, No. 1, (Jan. 1983).
Fragano, Maurizio. Solid State Key/Lock Security System, pp. 604-607, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, vol. CE-30, No. 4, (Nov. 1984).
G. Davis, Marcstar.TM. TRC1300 and TRC1315 Remote Control Transmitter/Receiver, Texas Instruments, Sep. 12, 1994. 1-24.
German Patent Application No. 10 2006 003 808.3; Official Action dated May 16, 2018; 6 pages.
German Patent Application No. 10 2006 003 808.8; Official Action dated Feb. 14, 2019 (with translation of relevant parts); 6 pages.
German Patent Application No. 10 2006 003 808.8; Official Action dated Oct. 9, 2018 (with translation of relevant parts); 7 pages.
German Patent Application No. 10 2006 063 085.8; Official Action dated Nov. 7, 2019 (with translation of relevant parts); 14 pages.
German Patent Application No. 10 2007 036 647.9; Official Communication dated Jul. 4, 2019, 4 pages.
Godlewski, Ph. and Camion P. ‘Manipulations and Errors, Delection and Localization,’ pp. 97-106, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Godlewski, Ph. and Camion P. 'Manipulations and Errors, Delection and Localization,' pp. 97-106, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Gordon, Professor J., Police Scientific Development Branch, Designing Codes for Vehicle Remote Security Systems, (Oct. 1994), pp. 1-20.
Gordon, Professor J., Police Scientific Development Branch, Designing Rolling Codes for Vehicle Remote Security Systems, (Aug. 1993), pp. 1-19.
Greenlee, B.M., Requirements for Key Management Protocols in the Wholesale Financial Services Industry, pp. 22 28, IEEE Communications Magazine , Sep. 1985.
Guillou, Louis C. and Quisquater, Jean-Jacques. ‘A Practical Zero-Knowledge Protocol Fitted to Security Microprocessor Minimizing Both Transmission and Memory’, pp. 123-128, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Guillou, Louis C. and Quisquater, Jean-Jacques. 'A Practical Zero-Knowledge Protocol Fitted to Security Microprocessor Minimizing Both Transmission and Memory', pp. 123-128, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Guillou, Louis C. Smart Cards and Conditional Access, pp. 481-489, Proceedings of Eurocrypt, (1984).
Habermann, A. Nico, Synchronization of Communicating Processes, pp. 171 176, Communications, Mar. 1972.
Hagelin C-35/C-36 (The), (1 page) Undated. http://hem.passagen.se/tan01/C035.HTML.
Haykin, Simon, "An Introduction to Analog and Digital Communications" 213, 215 (1989).
IEEE 100; The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Ediciton, Published by Standards Information Network, IEEE Press, Copyright 2000.
International Search Report for PCT/US03/25308 dated Mar. 25, 2004.
ISO 8732: 1988(E): Banking Key Management (Wholesale) Annex D: Windows and Windows Management, Nov. 1988.
ITC Tutorial; Investigation No. 337-TA-417; (TCG024374-24434); Dated: Jul. 7, 1999.
Jones, Anita K. Protection Mechanisms and The Enforcement of Security Policies, pp. 228-251, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, (1978).
Jueneman, R.R. et al. ‘Message Authentication’, pp. 29-40, IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 23, No. 9, Sep. 1985.
Jueneman, R.R. et al. 'Message Authentication', pp. 29-40, IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 23, No. 9, Sep. 1985.
Kahn, Robert E. The Organization of Computer Resources Into A Packet Radio Network, pp. 177-186, National Computer Conference, (1975).
Keeloq.RTM. Code Hopping Decoder, HCS500, 1997 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-25.
Keeloq.RTM. Code Hopping Encoder, HCS300, 1996 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-20.
Keeloq.RTM. NTQ 105 Code Hopping Encoder, pp. 1-8, Nanoteq (Pty.) Ltd., (Jul. 1993).
Keeloq.RTM. NTQ 125D Code Hopping Decoder, pp. 1-9, Nanoteq (pty.) Ltd., (Jul. 1993).
Kent, Stephen T. A Comparison of Some Aspects of Public-Key and Conventional Cryptosystems, pp. 4.3.1-5, ICC '79 Int. Conf. on Communications, Boston, MA, (Jun. 1979).
Kent, Stephen T. Comments on ‘Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite’, pp. 10-19, Computer Communication Review, vol. 19, Part 3, (Jul. 1989).
Kent, Stephen T. Comments on 'Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite', pp. 10-19, Computer Communication Review, vol. 19, Part 3, (Jul. 1989).
Kent, Stephen T. Encryption-Based Protection Protocols for Interactive User-Computer Communication, pp. 1-121, (May 1976). (See pp. 50-53).
Kent, Stephen T. Protocol Design Consideration for Network Security, pp. 239-259, Proc. NATO Advanced Study Institute on Interlinking of Computer Networks, (1979).
Kent, Stephen T. Security Requirements and Protocols for a Broadcast Scenario, pp. 778-786, IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. com-29, No. 6, (Jun. 1981).
Kent, Stephen T., et al. Personal Authorization System for Access Control to the Defense Data Network, pp. 89-93, Conf. Record of Eascon 82 15.sup.th Ann Electronics & Aerospace Systems Conf., Washington, D.C. (Sep. 1982).
Konheim, A.G. Cryptography: A Primer, pp. 285-347, New York, (John Wiley, 1981).
Koren, Israel, "Computer Arithmetic Algorithms" Prentice Hall, 1978, pp. 1-15.
Kruh, Louis. Device anc Machines: The Hagelin Cryptographer, Type C-52, pp. 78-82, Cryptologia, vol. 3, No. 2, (Apr. 1979).
Kruh, Louis. How to Use the German Enigma Cipher Machine: A photographic Essay, pp. 291-296, Cryptologia, vol. No. 7, No. 4 (Oct. 1983).
Kuhn, G.J., et al. A Versatile High-Speed Encryption Chip, Infosec '90 Symposium, Pretoria, (Mar. 16, 1990).
Kuhn. G.J. Algorithms for Self-Synchronizing Ciphers, pp. 159-164, Comsig 88, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, (1988).
Lamport, Leslie. The Synchronization of Independent Processes, pp. 15-34, Acta Informatica, vol. 7, (1976).
Lear Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment; May 22, 2008.
Linn, John and Kent, Stephen T. Electronic Mail Privacy Enhancement, pp. 40-43, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. (1986).
Lloyd, Sheelagh. Counting Functions Satisfying a Higher Order Strict Avalanche Criterion, pp. 63-74, (1990).
Marneweck, Kobus. Guidelines for KeeLoq.RTM. Secure Learning Implementation, TB007, pp. 1-5, 1987 Microchip Technology, Inc.
Massey, James L. The Difficulty with Difficulty, pp. 1-4, (Updated). http://www.iacr.org/conferences/ec96/massey/html/framemassey.html.
McIvor, Robert. Smart Cards, pp. 152-159, Scientific American, vol. 253, No. 5, (Nov. 1985).
Meier, Willi. Fast Correlations Attacks on Stream Ciphers (Extended Abstract), pp. 301-314, Eurocrypt 88, IEEE, (1988).
Meyer, Carl H. and Matyas Stephen H. Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security, pp. 237-249 (1982).
Michener, J.R. The ‘Generalized Rotor’ Cryptographic Operator and Some of Its Applications, pp. 97-113, Cryptologia, vol. 9, No. 2, (Apr. 1985).
Michener, J.R. The 'Generalized Rotor' Cryptographic Operator and Some of Its Applications, pp. 97-113, Cryptologia, vol. 9, No. 2, (Apr. 1985).
Microchip Technology, Inc., Enhanced Flash Microcontrollers with 10-Bit A/D and nano Watt Technology, PIC18F2525/2620/4525/4620 Data Sheet, 28/40/44-Pin, .COPYRGT.2008.
Microchip v. The Chamberlain Group, Inc., (TCG019794-019873); Deposition of J. Fitzgibbon; Partially redacted; Dated: Jan. 7, 1999.
Microchip v. The Chamberlain Group, Inc., (TCG019874-019918); Deposition of J. Fitzgibbon; Dated: Mar. 16, 1999.
Microchip v. The Chamberlain Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 98-C-6138; (TCG024334-24357); Declaration of V. Thomas Rhyne; Dated: Feb. 22, 1999.
MM57HS01 HiSeC.TM. Fixed and Rolling Code Decoder, National Semiconductor, Nov. 11, 1994, 1-8.
Morris, Robert. The Hagelin Cipher Machine (M-209): Reconstruction of the Internal Settings, pp. 267-289, Cryptologia, 2(3), (Jul. 1978).
Newman, David B., Jr., et al. ‘Public Key Management for Network Security’, pp. 11-16, IEE Network Magazine, 1987.
Newman, David B., Jr., et al. 'Public Key Management for Network Security', pp. 11-16, IEE Network Magazine, 1987.
Nickels, Hamilton, ‘Secrets of Making and Breading Codes’ Paladin Press, 1990, pp. 11-29.
Nickels, Hamilton, 'Secrets of Making and Breading Codes' Paladin Press, 1990, pp. 11-29.
Niederreiter, Harald. Keystream Sequences with a Good Linear Complexity Profile for Every Starting Point, pp. 523-532, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 89, (1989).
NM95HSO1/NM95HSO2 HiSeC.TM. (High Security Code) Generator, pp. 1-19, National Semiconductor, (Jan. 1995).
Otway, Dave and Rees, Owen. Efficient and timely mutual authentication, ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, vol. 21, Issue 1, Jan. 8-10, 1987.
Peebles, Jr., Peyton Z. and Giuma, Tayeb A.; "Principles of Electrical Engineering" McGraw Hill, Inc., 1991, pp. 562-597.
Peyret, Patrice, et al. Smart Cards Provide Very High Security and Flexibility in Subscribers Management, pp. 744-752, IEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 36(3), (Aug. 1990).
Postel, J. ed. ‘DOD Standard Transmission Control Protocol’, pp. 52-133, Jan. 1980.
Postel, J. ed. 'DOD Standard Transmission Control Protocol', pp. 52-133, Jan. 1980.
Postel, Jonathon B., et al. The ARPA Internet Protocol, pp. 261-271, (1981).
Reed, David P. and Kanodia, Rajendra K. Synchronization with Eventcounts and Sequencers, pp. 115-123, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, No. 2, (Feb. 1979).
Reynolds, J. and Postel, J. Official ARPA-Internet Protocols, Network Working Groups, (Apr. 1985).
Roden, Martin S., "Analog and Digital Communication Systems," Third Edition, Prentice Hall, 1979, pp. 282-460.
Ruffell, J. Battery Low Indicator, p. 15-165, Eleckton Electronics, (Mar. 1989). (See p. 59).
Saab Anti-Theft System: ‘Saab's Engine Immobilizing Anti-Theft System is a Road-Block for ‘Code-Grabbing’ Thieves’, pp. 1-2, Aug. 1996; http://www.saabusa.com/news/newsindex/alarm.html.
Saab Anti-Theft System: 'Saab's Engine Immobilizing Anti-Theft System is a Road-Block for 'Code-Grabbing' Thieves', pp. 1-2, Aug. 1996; http://www.saabusa.com/news/newsindex/alarm.html.
Savage. J.E. Some Simple Self-Synchronizing Digital Data Scramblers, pp. 449-498, The Bell System Tech. Journal, (Feb. 1967).
Schedule of Confidential Non-Patent Literature Documents; Apr. 1, 2008.
Search Report Under Section 17 from British Patent Application No. GB0613068.6; Date of Search: Oct. 12, 2006.
Search Report Under Section 17, Application No. GB0715089.9; dated Nov. 27, 2007.
Search Report Under Section 17; Application No. GB0715089.9: Date of Search: May 8, 2008.
Seberry, J. and Pieprzyk, Cryptography-An Introduction to Computer Security, Prentice Hall of Australia, YTY Ltd, 1989, pp. 134-136.
Seberry, J. and Pieprzyk, Cryptography—An Introduction to Computer Security, Prentice Hall of Australia, YTY Ltd, 1989, pp. 134-136.
Secure Terminal Interface Module for Smart Card Application, pp. 1488-1489, IBM: Technical Disclosure Bulletin, vol. 28, No. 4, (Sep. 1985).
Shamir, Adi. ‘Embedding Cryptographic Trapdoors in Arbitrary Knapsack Systems’, pp. 77-79, Information Processing Letters, 1983.
Shamir, Adi. 'Embedding Cryptographic Trapdoors in Arbitrary Knapsack Systems', pp. 77-79, Information Processing Letters, 1983.
Shamir, Adi. Embedding cryptographic Trapdoors in Arbitrary Knapsak Systems, pp. 81-85, IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. C-34, No. 1, (Jan. 1985).
Siegenthaler, T. Decrypting a Class of Stream Ciphers Using Ciphertext Only, pp. 81-85, IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. C-34, No. 1, (Jan. 1985).
Simmons, Gustavus, J. Message Authentication with Arbitration of Transmitter/Receiver Disputes, pp. 151-165 (1987).
Smith, J.L., et al. An Experimental Application of Crptography to a Remotely Accessed Data System, pp. 282-297, Proceedings of hte ACM, (Aug. 1972).
Smith, Jack, ‘Modem Communication Circuits.’ McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986, Chapter 11, pp. 420-454.
Smith, Jack, ‘Modem Communication Circuits’ McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986, Chapter 7, pp. 231-294.
Smith, Jack, 'Modem Communication Circuits' McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986, Chapter 7, pp. 231-294.
Smith, Jack, 'Modem Communication Circuits.' McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986, Chapter 11, pp. 420-454.
Smith. J.L. The Design of Lucifer: a Cryptographic Device for Data Communications, pp. 1-65, (Apr. 15, 1971).
Soete, M. Some constructions for authentication-secrecy codes, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt '88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 303 (1988), 57-75.
Soete, M. Some constructions for authentication—secrecy codes, Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt '88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 303 (1988), 57-75.
Steven Dawson, Keeloq.RTM. Code Hopping Decoder Using Secure Learn, AN662, 1997 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-16.
Svigals, J. Limiting Access to Data in an Indentification Card Having A Micro-Processor, pp. 580-581, IBM: Technical Disclosre Bulletin, vol. 27, No. 1B, (Jun. 1984).
Thatcham: The Motor Insurance Repair Research Centre, The British Insurance Industry's Criteria for Vehicle Security (Jan. 1993) (Lear 18968-19027), pp. 1-36.
Transaction Completion Code Based on Digital Signatures, pp. 1109-1122, IBM: Technical Disclosure Bulletin, vol. 28, No. 3, (Aug. 1985).
Turn, Rein. Privacy Transformations for Databank Systems, pp. 589-601, National Computer Conference, (1973).
U.S. Appl. No. 11/044,411; Office Action dated Oct. 20, 2005.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/058,135; Office Action dated Oct. 6, 2010.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,524; Office Action Dated Apr. 9, 2009.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Apr. 2, 2009.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Mar. 17, 2010.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Mar. 21, 2011.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Oct. 15, 2009.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Sep. 16, 2011.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525; Office Action dated Sep. 9, 2010.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/480,288; Office Action dated Apr. 9, 2008.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/480,288; Office Action dated Oct. 30, 2006.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/501,455; Office Action dated Jul. 7, 2010.
U.S. Appl. No. 11/501,455; Office Action dated Sep. 21, 2010.
U.S. Appl. No. 12/822,499; Office Action dated Jan. 17, 2013.
U.S. Appl. No. 13/777,787; Notice of Allowance dated Oct. 16, 2020; (pp. 1-5).
U.S. Appl. No. 13/777,787; Office Action dated Aug. 19, 2013.
U.S. Appl. No. 13/777,787; Office Action dated Dec. 5, 2013.
U.S. Appl. No. 13/777,787; Office Action dated Mar. 9, 2017.
U.S. Appl. No. 14/219,607; Office Action dated Oct. 28, 2014.
U.S. Appl. No. 14/867,633, Office Action dated Jul. 19, 2018, 22 pages.
U.S. Appl. No. 14/867,633; Corrected Notice of Allowability dated Oct. 27, 2020; (pp. 1-2).
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, Declaration of Robert Louis Stevenson, Jr., Jun. 26, 2009.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, JCI's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement of the '056 Patent; Jul. 6, 2009.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, JCI's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement of the '544 Patent; Jul. 6, 2009.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, JCI's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement of the '056 Patent, Jul. 6, 2009.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, JCI's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement of the '544 Patent, Jul. 6, 2009.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-C-3449, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Nov. 24, 2010.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Defendant Lear Corporation's Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Defenses, and Counterclaim; Sep. 8, 2008.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Defendant Lear Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Stay Effectiveness of Any Preliminary Injunction; Apr. 17, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment of U.S. Pat. No. 7,412,056; Dec. 8, 2008.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation's Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint; Oct. 24, 2005.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Emergency Motion to Stay the Effectiveness of the Preliminary Injunction Memorandum Opinion and Order Entered Mar. 30, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, May 22, 2008.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Sep. 11, 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Claim Construction.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Lear Corporation's Post-Markman Brief.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Apr. 25, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Feb. 20, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Sep. 11, 2006.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Memorandum Opinion and Order; Mar. 30, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File Defendant Lear Corporation's Sur-Reply to Chamberlain's and JCI's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Mar. 30, 2006.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Lear Corporation's Motion to Stay the Effectiveness of the Preliminary Injunction Memorandum Opinion and Order Entered Mar. 30, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Plaintiffs' Response to Lear's Mar. 2, 2007 Supplemental Memorandum.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Plaintiffs' Response to Lear's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Sep. 11, 2006 Ruling Regarding Claim Construction; Oct. 4, 2006.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Plaintiffs' Surreply Memorandum in Opposition to Lear's Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction, Apr. 24, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Plaintiffs' Surreply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Reply Brief in Support of Lear's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Sep. 11, 2006 Ruling Regarding Claim Construction.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lear Corporation's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Mar. 2, 2007.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Transcript of Deposition of Bradford L. Farris, Jan. 12, 2006.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Transcript of Deposition of Hubert E. Dunsmore, Jan. 12, 2006.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable James B. Moran, May 31, 2005.
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action No. 05-CV-3449, Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable James B. Moran, May 31, 2006.
U.S. Office Action Dated Mar. 21, 2011 from U.S. Appl. No. 11/172,525.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Case No. 05-CV-3449, Brief of Defendant-Appellant Lear Corporation.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Case No. 05-CV-3449, Brief of the Chamberlain Group, Inc. and Johnson Controls Interiors LLC; Aug. 8, 2007.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Case No. 05-CV-3449, Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Chamberlain Group, Inc.and Johnson Controls Interiors LLC; Dated Mar. 19, 2008.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Case No. 05-CV-3449, Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Lear Corporation, Aug. 29, 2007.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeal from the United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois in Case No. 05-CV-3449, Appellate Decision, Feb. 19, 2008.
United States Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil Action 05 C 3449, Notice Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 282, Mar. 4, 2011.
United States International Trade Commission in the Matter of Certain Code Hopping Remote Control Systems, Including Components and Integrated Circuits Used Therein; Investigation No. 337-TA-417; Expert Report of Dr. V. Thomas Rhyne; (TCG019919-19959); Partially redacted; Dated Jul. 7, 1999.
United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D., Investigation No. 337-TA-417; Respondents' Answer to Complaint and Notice of Investigation, Jan. 26, 1999.
USPTO; U.S. Appl. No. 14/867,633; Office Action dated Sep. 17, 2019; (pp. 1-25).
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. ‘Security in High-Level Network Protocols’, IEEE Communications Magazine, pp. 12-25, vol. 23, No. 7, Jul. 1985.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. ‘Security Mechanisms in High-Level Network Protocols’, Computing Surveys, pp. 135-171, vol. 15, No. 2, Jun. 1983.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. 'Security in High-Level Network Protocols', IEEE Communications Magazine, pp. 12-25, vol. 23, No. 7, Jul. 1985.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. Security Mechanisms in a Transport Layer Protocol, pp. 325-341, Computers & Security, (1985).
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. 'Security Mechanisms in High-Level Network Protocols', Computing Surveys, pp. 135-171, vol. 15, No. 2, Jun. 1983.
Watts, Charles and Harper John. How to Design a HiSec.TM. Transmitter, pp. 1-4, National Semiconductor, (Oct. 1994).
Weinstein, S.B. Smart Credit Cards: The Answer to Cashless Shopping, pp. 43-49, IEEE Spectrum, (Feb. 1984).
Weissman, C. Securtiy Controls in the ADEPT-50 Time-Sharing Syustem, pp. 119-133, AFIPS Full Joint Compuer Conference, (1969).
Welsh, Dominic, Codes and Cryptography, pp. 7.0-7.1, (Clarendon Press, 1988).
Wolfe, James Raymond, "Secret Writing-The Craft of the Cryptographer" McGraw-Hill Book Company 1970, pp. 111-122, Chapter 10.
Wolfe, James Raymond, "Secret Writing—The Craft of the Cryptographer" McGraw-Hill Book Company 1970, pp. 111-122, Chapter 10.

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11799648B2 (en) 2005-01-27 2023-10-24 The Chamberlain Group Llc Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US20210281405A1 (en) Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Transmission of an Encrypted Rolling Code
US7071850B1 (en) Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information
EP1871036A1 (en) Method, transporter and system for secure data exchange
US20110317835A1 (en) Method and Apparatus to Facilitate Wireline Transmission of an Encrypted Rolling Code
USRE48433E1 (en) Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
AU2011202656A1 (en) Method and apparatus to facilitate wireline transmission of an encrypted rolling code
US20230336341A1 (en) Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of an encrypted rolling code
EP1870833A2 (en) Method, transponder and system for rapid data exchange
WO2000028432A3 (en) System and method for recording receipt of information
EP3582447A1 (en) Obfuscation of frames in a control area network of a vehicle
JPH11261551A (en) Method for securing information transmission via open communication network
US7548557B2 (en) Method and apparatus for access control system message conveyance
JPH0575888A (en) Remote control transmitter
JP2007219915A (en) Sum value communication system for motorola s data
MXPA06001168A (en) Method and apparatus to facilitate transmission of ternary movable barrier operator information

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC., ILLINOIS

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:LAIRD, EDWARD T.;REEL/FRAME:043269/0540

Effective date: 20140711

Owner name: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC., ILLINOIS

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:FITZGIBBON, JAMES J.;GREGORI, ERIC;REEL/FRAME:043269/0546

Effective date: 20061030

AS Assignment

Owner name: ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT, NEW YORK

Free format text: SECOND LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNORS:THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC;SYSTEMS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:058015/0001

Effective date: 20211103

Owner name: WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT, COLORADO

Free format text: FIRST LIEN PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNORS:THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC;SYSTEMS, LLC;REEL/FRAME:058014/0931

Effective date: 20211103

AS Assignment

Owner name: THE CHAMBLERLAIN GROUP LLC, ILLINOIS

Free format text: CONVERSION;ASSIGNOR:THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.;REEL/FRAME:058738/0305

Effective date: 20210805

AS Assignment

Owner name: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC, ILLINOIS

Free format text: CONVERSION;ASSIGNOR:THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.;REEL/FRAME:060379/0207

Effective date: 20210805

AS Assignment

Owner name: SYSTEMS, LLC, ILLINOIS

Free format text: NOTICE OF TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS;ASSIGNOR:ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT;REEL/FRAME:066374/0749

Effective date: 20240126

Owner name: THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP LLC, ILLINOIS

Free format text: NOTICE OF TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS;ASSIGNOR:ARES CAPITAL CORPORATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT;REEL/FRAME:066374/0749

Effective date: 20240126